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GEOFFREY SIDESTEPS QUILL:
CONSTITUTIONAL NEXUS, INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY AND THE STATE
TAXATION OF INCOME
Michael T. Fatale*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1959, in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,' the United States Supreme Court addressed the "'need for
clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases' with reference to
the taxing power of the States" under the Commerce and the Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.2 Thirty-five years
later, after the Court's most recent pronouncementi on the subject-most notably in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota3-this need still

exists. Quill held that a state may not impose a use tax collection
obligation on a vendor unless that vendor is physically present in the
taxing state.4 However, Quill left unanswered whether a state can tax

the income of a corporation which is not physically present in the
state where the income is derived from intangible property owned by
the corporation and used within the state.5 In the recent case of

* Michael T. Fatale practices law in Boston, Massachusetts with the Rulings and Regulations Bureau of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue. The author thanks Kevin W.
Brown of the Rulings and Regulations Bureau of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue
for his help in the preparation of this Article.
This Article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and not necessarily those of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue.
1. 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
2. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940)).
3. 112 U.S. 1904 (1992).
4. See id. at 1907.

5. See Petition for Certiorari at 9, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue
and Taxation, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993) (No. 93-520) [hereinafter Geoffrey Cert. Brief] (noting
that Quill left open the Geoffrey question as to "whether a state may impose an income tax
on a taxpayer with no physical presence in the state"); see also 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN
& WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 6.08 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN]; Lee A. Sheppard, Geoffrey: The Commerce Clause In the Information Age, 6
STATE TAX NOTES 35, 37 (1993).
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Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,6 the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that a state could apply its income tax
to a corporation under these circumstances! The vitality of the analysis in that decision is the focus of this Article.8
II.BACKGROUND
Portland Cement involved a state's attempt to tax the net income
of the interstate operations of a foreign corporation. The Supreme

Court ruled that a state could tax this income, provided the tax "is
not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities with-

in the taxing state forming sufficient nexus to support [the tax]."'9 In

6. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 550 (1993). Six amicus curiae filed
briefs on behalf of Geoffrey, but none were filed on behalf of South Carolina. See Michael
J. Semes, A Discussion of Geoffrey Inc.'s Petition for Writ of Certiorari,South Carolina's R
esponse and Six Amicus Curiae Briefs. 5 STATE TAX NOTES 1297, 1303 (1993).
7. See Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d 13.

8. Certiorari was requested in Geoffrey, but was denied. 114 S.Ct. 550. While the
denial of certiorari has no legal significance per se, see Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v.
Wrigley, 112 S.Ct. 2447, 2452-53 (1992), at least one commentator has concluded that the
determination implicitly broadens the states' taxing powers. See Marlis L. Carson, Supreme
Court Denies Certiorari in Geoffrey, 5 STATE TAX NOTES 1352, 1352 (1993); see also
Jeffrey S. Peters, Income Tax Nexus: Are Physical Contacts Required? Geoffrey, Inc. Sets T

he Stage, STATE TAX REv., Sept. 27, 1993, at 6-7 (predicting this result); Semes, supra note
6, at 1302 (discussing the potential impact of the case). Commentators have split on the
correctness of Geoffrey, often, apparently, consistent with whether they typically represent
private or public interests. See, e.g., Geoffrey Filing Tops the State Tax Advisory Board's

Agenda, STATE TAX Rnv., Nov. 21, 1993, at 6-10 [hereinafter CCH Board Comments] (quoting comments both pro and contra, made by various members of the CCH State Tax Advisory Board); Peters, supra at 6-9 (contra); Semes, supra note 6, at 1297-1302 (contra); Gordon
W. Stewart, The Geoffrey Decision's Constitutional Problems, 5 STATE TAX NOTES 420, 420-

23 (1993) (contra).
9. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959).

Portland Cement was a significant development in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, since the Court explicitly recognized for the first time outside the context of state
property tax that an exclusively interstate business can be subject to the states' taxing powers.
See WALTER HELLERSTEIN; Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation, in 2 STATE

& LOCAL TAX PORTFOLIO SERIES I 815A (1991 & Supp. 1993). The dominant theme of
Portland Cement, which was subsequently expanded upon by the Court, was that "itis axiomatic that the founders did not intend to immunize such [interstate] commerce from carrying
its fair share of the costs of state government in return for the benefits it derives within the
State." See HELLERSTEIN, supra at 1224 (quoting Portland Cement, 358 U.S. at 461-62); see
also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 n.5 (1992) ("Under our current
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 'with certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes."') (quoting D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486
U.S. 24, 31 (1988)).
While Portland Cement expressly applied only to taxes levied on a corporation's net
income, the Court later, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), stan-
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response to Portland Cement, corporations with multi-state income
began isolating individual activities in newly-formed subsidiaries and

locating those activities in such a way as to avoid the taxing "nexus"
of individual states."0
After Portland Cement, the Supreme Court continued to revisit
the constitutional nexus requirements applicable to state taxation of
multi-state businesses. In this regard, one of the more significant
decisions was National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue."
In Bellas Hess, the Court determined that a state could not impose a

use tax collection obligation on a vendor where the vendor's only
contacts with the taxing state were by mail or common carrier. 2

This ruling, like that in Portland Cement, had a significant, commercial impact: it created an incentive for a consumer to purchase goods
from an out-of-state entity, since these purchases could be made without the corresponding payment of sales or use tax. 3 This incentive,
dardized its approach to all income-based corporate taxes. See PAuL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL
LImrrATONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, §§ 8.1, 8.6 (1981) [hereinafter HARTMAN,
FEDERAL LIMIrATIONS]; see also infra text accompanying notes 71-82 (discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
10. See Eugene F. Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions
and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REv. 423, 429 (1976). The facts in Geoffrey reveal
one example of this type of tax planning. The corporate-taxpayer in Geoffrey was specifically
incorporated in Delaware-which does not tax corporations that merely maintain and manage
intangible property--to minimize state tax. See infra note 142. Credit card companies also
typically engage in a similar type of tax evasion. See generally infra notes 228-31 and
accompanying text.
11. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
12. See id at 758. A use tax applies to property which is used, consumed or stored in
a state if that state would subject the in-state purchase of the same property to sales tax. The
rationale for the use tax was explained by the Supreme Court in Miller Brothers Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954):
Taxation of sales or purchases and taxation of use or possession of purchases are
complementary and related . . . . The former, a fiscal measure of considerable importance, has the effect of increasing the cost to the consumer of acquiring supplies in the taxing state. The use tax . . . usually appears as a support to the sales
tax . . . [to protect] the state's revenues by taking away from inhabitants the advantages of resort to untaxed out-of-state purchases.
Id. at 343.
13. In theory, the purchaser in these transactions remains directly liable for his or her
state's use tax. However, as a practical matter, there is very little tax compliance in these
instances, and very little capacity or incentive for the taxing state to track what most times
will be a de minimis tax payment Therefore, there is an incentive for a state to register the
out-of-state vendors which make sales in the state and to collect the use tax from them. See
id. ("The collection of the use tax from inhabitants is a difficult administrative problem, and
if out-of-state vendors can be compelled to collect it and remit it to the taxing state, it simplifies administration.") Throughout this Article the term "use tax" refers to the use tax collection obligation which is imposed by the various states upon vendors-and not to the pri-
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in tum,
contributed to the dramatic growth of the mail order busi4
ness.1
In Quill, the Court re-affirmed Bellas Hess, which had come to

be widely criticized as inconsistent with the practical realities of the
commercial world."5 In addition, the Court sought to clarify, once
again, the Due Process and Commerce Clause restrictions upon states
seeking to tax multi-state businesses. In this regard, the Court distinguished between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause-something it noted it had not always clearly done"6 -and
analyzed the requirements under each. In so doing, the Court made
clear that there are two constitutional nexus requirements, one under
each clause. The Due Process nexus requirement is less onerous, and

approximates the "minimum contacts" analysis utilized in the context
of adjudicative jurisdiction." The Commerce Clause nexus requirement is more stringent and necessitates that there be "substantial
nexus."' 8 At least in the context of a use tax, the substantial nexus
test requires that the vendor be physically present in the taxing
state. 9
While Quill resolved a number of questions, it did not address
the issue faced by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Geoffrey-whether the mere ownership and use of intangible property

within a taxing state can create nexus. The specific question in
Geoffrey was whether a state has nexus with a corporation for income
tax purposes where that corporation licenses intangible property into
the state and derives income from its use therein.2" Geoffrey held

mary purchaser use tax liability which forms the underlying basis for this collection obligation.
14. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1992).
15. Justice White, dissenting in Quill, referenced the following sources critical of the
Bellas Hess decision: HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMrrATONS, supra note 9, § 10.8; Paul J.
Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV.
993, 1006-14 (1986) [hereinafter Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax]; Jerome R. Hellerstein,
Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 961, 984-85 (1986); Sandra B. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 288-90; Charles Rothfeld, Mail Order Sales and State
Jurisdiction to Tax, 53 TAx NoTEs 1405, 1414-18 (1991). Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1917 n.1
(White, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 40-43 (discussing the North
Dakota Supreme Court's criticism of Bellas Hess in its Quill decision).
16. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916.
17. See id. at 1909-11.
18. See id. at 1911-16.
19. See id. at 1914, 1916.
20. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993). Geoffrey involved a Delaware holding company licensing the
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that there is taxing nexus under these circumstances. In so holding,
Geoffrey relied on two doctrines which have been referenced favorably by the Supreme Court: the business situs rule, which applies to
intangible property, and the economic benefits test. The business situs

rule, referenced in various cases, including Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Fox,' states generally that an item of intangible property acquires a
taxable situs in a state when it is used in that state in a local business.' The economic benefits test, often quoted, most times from
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney,24 states that "[a] state is free to pursue its
own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the
practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation

to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, [and] to benefits which it has conferred . ... ."'
This Article evaluates the correctness of the analysis utilized by
Geoffrey. It proceeds in four sections. Part I analyzes Quill and, in
particular, the Court's articulation of the physical presence test. This
section determines that it is unclear whether the physical presence test
applies outside the area of use tax. However-whether or not it
does-Quill seems to permit a finding of constitutional nexus based
upon the ownership and use of intangible property within a taxing
state. Part IV examines the analysis set forth in Geoffrey. In particular, this section evaluates Geoffrey in light of Quill, and focuses on
the business situs rule and economic benefits test. This section con-

"Toys R Us" trademarks and trade names. Id; see generally infra text accompanying notes
140-0.
21. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18. Geoffrey, relying on Quill, concluded that the Bellas
Hess physical presence rule has not been extended outside the area of sales and use taxes.
Id. at 18 n.4.
22. 298 U.S. 193, 210 (1936).
23. See generally infra text accompanying notes 192-216. Wheeling Steel is discussed i
nfra note 196 and accompanying text.
24. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
25. Id. at 444. Geoffrey does not reference J.C. Penney, but rather quotes similar language contained in International Harvester v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435,
441-42 (1944), a case which relied heavily on J.C. Penney. See Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
The similar language in International Harvester-and a discussion of J.C. Penney and International Harvester-is set forth below. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. The economic benefits test set forth in J.C. Penney has been repeatedly referenced by the Court in
its state tax constitutional cases. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753, 756 (1967); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota. 358 U.S. 450,
464-65 (1959). However, while J.C. Penney is typically cited for this economic benefits language, similar language appears in earlier cases, such as Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357,
368 (1939). See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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cludes that, while Quill calls into question whether the economic
benefits test supports Geoffrey, that case also suggests that Geoffrey
reaches the right result under the business situs rule. Part V evaluates
whether a rule which posits constitutional nexus based upon the business situs of intangible property is supported by the line of analysis
used by the Supreme Court in Quill. This section concludes that the
approach used by Quill does support the use of the business situs
rule. Finally, the Article summarizes its salient conclusions.

I.

QUILL CORP. V. NORTH DAKOTA

A.

The Opinion

1. The Facts and the Prior Case History
In Quill, the state of North Dakota sought to apply its use tax
statute to an out-of-state mail order company with no outlets or sales
representatives present in the state. 6 In Bellas Hess, the Supreme
Court had held that a statute similar to North Dakota's violated the
Due Process Clause and unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce." Notably, the Court in Bellas Hess ruled that a "seller whose
only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or
the United States mail" lacks the minimum contacts with the state
necessary to uphold the tax.2"
Quill, a Delaware corporation, maintained offices and warehouses
in Illinois, California, and Georgia.29 None of its employees worked
or lived in North Dakota and Quill did not own any significant tangible property in that state. 30 Quill predominantly sells office equipment and supplies. 1 In addition, it solicits business through catalogs,
flyers, and telephone calls, and advertises in periodicals throughout
the country.32 At the time of the Court's decision, Quill's annual

26. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 (1992).
27. See id.; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
28. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.

29. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1907.
30. Id. at 1907-08. At trial, North Dakota argued that Quill's unconditional 90-day guarantee to its customers caused it to retain title to the goods for ninety days after delivery to
its customers. Id. at 1907 n.1. The trial court disagreed, holding that title passed when customer received the merchandise. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted this ruling as
correct and noted that Quill licensed a computer software program to some of its North
Dakota customers enabling them to check Quill's current inventories and prices and allowing
them to place orders directly. Id.
31. Id. at 1907.
32. Id.
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national sales exceeded $200,000,000-with its 3,000 North Dakota
customers generating almost $1,000,000 in sales. 3 These latter sales
made Quill the sixth largest office supplies vendor in North Dakota. Merchandise was delivered to the North Dakota customers by
mail or common carrier from locations outside the state.35
North Dakota brought an action for declaratory judgment seeking
a determination that Quill was required to collect and remit the applicable state use tax.36 It argued that the statute defined a "retailer" as
"'every person who engages in a regular or systematic solicitation of
a consumer market in th[e] state."'37 The statute further defined "reg-'
ular or systematic solicitation" to mean three or more advertisements
within a 12-month period.38 Quill contested the state's action, claiming that North Dakota was without the power to compel it to collect
a use tax from its North Dakota customers.39
The trial court, finding the case indistinguishable from Bellas
Hess, agreed with Quill.' However, the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that "'wholesale changes' in both the economy and
the law made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess" in the contemporary realm." The North Dakota Supreme Court cited the astounding growth of the mail order business "'from a relatively inconsequential market niche' in 1967 to a 'goliath' with annual sales that
reached "the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989"' as the
predominant economic change.42 Moreover, it noted that computer
technology had greatly assisted compliance with a "'welter of complicated obligations"' imposed by both state and local taxing authorities.43

33. Id. at 1907-08.
34. Id. at 1908.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-402-01(6) (Supp. 1991)).
Many states had enacted similar statutes, though not all of these states had enforced them
vigorously. See Rothfeld, supra note 15 at 1405-06.
38. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988)).
39. Id.
40. Id. Specifically, the trial court found that "because the state had not shown that it
had spent tax revenues for the benefit of the mail-order business, there was no 'nexus to
allow the state to define the retailer in the manner it choose."' Id. (quoting App. to Petition
for Certiorari at A41).
41. Id. (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 213 (N.D. 1991)).
42. Id. (quoting Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 208-09).
43. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 215 (quoting National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967)).
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In addition to the changes in the economy, the North Dakota
Supreme Court focused on the changes in the "legal landscape."'
With respect to the Commerce Clause, it concluded that Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady45 and its progeny indicated that the physical
presence nexus suggested in Bellas Hess was no longer required. 4 ,
Similarly, with respect to the Due Process Clause, the North Dakota
court determined that the requisite "minimum contacts" do not require
physical presence.4 7 The court concluded that the due process requirement of minimum contacts was encompassed within the Complete Auto test and that the relevant inquiry was whether "the state
has provided some protection, opportunity, or benefit for which it can
expect a return., 41 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this
test was satisfied in Quill because North Dakota had created an "economic climate that foster[ed] demand for" Quill's products, maintained a legal infrastructure that protected the market, and disposed of
over twenty tons of catalogs that Quill mailed into the state every
49
year.
In reviewing the situation in Quill, the United States Supreme
Court began with a brief analysis of the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses. It noted that its holding in Bellas Hess had relied on both of
these "closely related" clauses. 0 The Court admitted that it has not
always been clear in distinguishing between the two clauses, but that
they are fundamentally different in that they reflect different constitutional concerns." In this regard, the Court noted that "Congress has
plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may
authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce," yet it "does
not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Pro-

44. Id. at 209.
45. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
46. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 214-15. According to the United States Supreme Court, the
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274, adopted a "consistent . . . method of inquiry [that focused on] the practical effect of [the] challenged tax."
Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1904 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,

443 (1980)).
47. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 216.
48. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court indicates that it adopted this test from Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940) and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 216; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 218-19.
50. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909 (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756).
51. Id. at 1909.
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cess Clause." 2 Also, it noted that, as in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc.
v. Washington State Department of Revenue,"3 the imposition of a
state tax may pass muster under the Due Process Clause, but nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.' The Court proceeded to address
the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause, separately, at greater
length.
2. The Due Process Clause

The Court stated that the Due Process Clause "'requires some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,' 5 and that the 'income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to "values connected with the taxing state."' 5' 6 It noted that Quill
was concerned with the former of these two requirements. 7 As to
this first requirement, the Court stated that prior to Bellas Hess it had

found the necessary minimum connection in a number of cases pertaining to a use tax-all involving some sort of physical presence
within the taxing state, such as the placement of sales personnel in
the state or the operation of local retail stores.5 8 The "furthest extension" of these cases, the Court stated, was Scripto, Inc. v Carson,9
where the Court found physical presence and upheld a use tax, even
though independent contractors solicited all of the in-state customers." It then noted that Bellas Hess suggested that physical presence

52. Id.
53. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).

54. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909.
55. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)). Miller
Brothers is discussed in greater detail infra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
56. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909-10 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,
273 (1978) (citation omitted)).
57. Id. at 1910.
58. Id. With respect to the examples given, the Court quoted the statement in Bellas
Hess that the exercise of taxing power was justified because the seller's local activities were
"'plainly accorded the protection and services of the taxing State."' Id. (quoting National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 757 (1967)).
59. 362 U.S. 207 (1960)
60. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910. Like Bellas Hess, Quill harmonized Scripto with its physical presence requirement even though, under agency principles, the corporation in question in
Scripto was not physically present in the taxing state. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760, 764
(Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing, inter alia, that the corporation in Bellas Hess should have
been taxable just like that in Scripto, since in each case the vendor had "no office or place
of business in the State, and had no property or employees there"). In Scripto, there were ten
independent contractors who worked part-time on the corporation's behalf. Scripto, 362 U.S.
at 211. Commentators have suggested that Scripto signaled a movement by the Court to an
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was necessary-not simply sufficient-for jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause.6' Indeed, Bellas Hess intentionally refrained from
blurring the "sharp distinction . . . between mail order sellers with
retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do
no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or
common carrier as a part of a general interstate business. ' 62
After evaluating Bellas Hess, the Court acknowledged that its

due process jurisdiction evolved substantially after that case, particularly in the area of "judicial jurisdiction."'63 As the Court stated al-

most fifty years ago in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' the
relevant test for jurisdiction is whether the defendant's contacts with
the jurisdiction are "such that the maintenance of the suit does not

offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 65
Applying this principle, the Court noted that a foreign corporation's
purposeful availment of the forum state's economy can subject it to
the state's jurisdiction, even if the corporation is not physically present in the state.' Similar logic, the Court concluded, justifies impos-

economically based jurisdictional standard as the relevant test for determining presence in a
taxing state. See Fred 0. Marcus, Limitations on the States' Jurisdiction To Impose Net In.
come Based Taxes, in I STATE & LOCAL TAX PORTFOLIO SERIES
310.6 (1991 & Supp.
1993) [hereinafter Marcus]; see also Arthur R. Rosen & Marc D. Bernstein, State Taxation of
Corporations: The Evolving Danger of Attributional Nexus, 41 TAX EXECUTIVE 553, 575
(1989) (noting that Scripto involved nexus based upon the attribution of presence).
61. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910.
62. See id. (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758).
63. Id. The primary statement in Bellas Hess concerning due process was taken from
J.C. Penney. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 ("And in determining whether a state tax falls
within the confines of the Due Process Clause, the Court has said that the 'simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return."') (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). For a discussion of J.C
Penney, see infra note 177.
64. 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
65. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). The Court stated that the inquiry is whether the defendant's contacts with the forum
state make it reasonable to compel the defendant to defend the suit in that forum. Quill, 112
S. Ct. at 1910.
66. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910. In this regard, the Court quoted from Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz:
"Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the
defendant did not physically enter the forum state. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce
the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and
wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial
actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' towards residents of another State, we
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ing a collection duty on a mail-order corporation that continuously
solicits business within the state.67 Such a corporation, the Court
stated, clearly has "'fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."' 6 Based upon this reasoning,
the Court concluded that, "to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a
State for the imposition of a duty to collect a use tax, we overrule
those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due
process."'69 In light of this conclusion, the Court noted, "[i]n this
case, there is no question that Quill has purposefully directed its
activities at North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts are more than sufficient for due process purposes, and that the
use tax70 is related to the benefits Quill receives from access to the

State.

3. The Commerce Clause
a. The Historical Analysis
After evaluating the Due Process Clause, the Court proceeded to
the Commerce Clause.7 1 It began by noting that the Commerce
Clause does not expressly prohibit state actions that interfere with
interstate commerce, but rather merely authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States.,72 However, the Commerce Clause also contains a judiciallycreated negative or "dormant" aspect.73 The Court proceeded to review the substantial evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause, with
respect to limitations imposed upon state taxing powers. It traced this
evolution beginning with the rule prohibiting direct rather than indirect taxation of interstate commerce; the later adoption of a "multiple
taxation doctrine"--which focused on whether a state's tax affected
interstate commerce through a risk of multiple taxation; and the subsequent return to the direct-indirect approach.74 The Court noted that,
have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there."
Id. at 1910-11 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

69. Id. at 1911.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3).
Id.
Id. The return to the direct-indirect approach came in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S.
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7
after returning to the direct-indirect approach in Freeman v. Hewit,"
it reapplied this approach in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor" to strike down a tax on the "privilege of doing interstate
business." Over twenty-five years later, however, the Court renounced the Freeman-Spectorapproach in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady," as "'attaching constitutional significance to a semantic
difference."' 79 Complete Auto expressly overruled Spector because,
under Spector, a differently denominated tax with the same result
would not have been unconstitutional8 0
The Court concluded that the four-part test articulated in Complete Auto governs the constitutionality of state taxes with respect to
the Commerce Clause." Under the Complete Auto test the Court:

will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as
the 'tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.'"
Bellas Hess was handed down after Freeman and Spector, but
before Complete Auto. While the Court noted that there is language
in Complete Auto which emphasizes the importance of looking beyond "'the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect,' ' 3 it stated that Complete Auto did not render Bellas Hess obsolete.' According to the Court, Complete Auto rejected the "formal
distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' taxes . . . [which] allowed
the validity of [a tax] to hinge on 'legal terminology,' 'draftsmanship

249 (1946), where the Court invalidated Indiana's gross receipts tax on a particular transaction because applying it would "'impos[e] a direct tax on interstate sales."' Quill, 112 S. Ct.
at 1911 (quoting Freeman, 329 U.S. at 256) (alteration in original).
75. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
76. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
77. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
78. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
79. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285; see also Quill. 112 S. Ct. at 1911-12.
80. See Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281.

81. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
82. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279). The Court also
noted that under its "current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 'with certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes."' Id. at 1912 n.5
(quoting D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24. 31 (1988)).
83. Id. at 1912 (alteration in original) (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279).
84. Id.
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and phraseology."' 85 Because Bellas Hess did not rely on the classification of taxes,
it did not necessarily fall under the analysis in
86
Complete Auto.

Although conceding that its current Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not bring about the same result if the issue were one of
first impression, the Court found that Bellas Hess was not inconsistent
with Complete Auto and its recent cases. 7 Relating Bellas Hess to
Complete Auto's four-part test, the Court stated that "Bellas Hess
concerns the first [part of the test] and stands for the proposition that
a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or

common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the Commerce Clause." 8 This explains why the Court cited Bellas Hess in
National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization,9
just three weeks after Complete Auto, and why the Court has continued to cite the case with approval ever since.9"

85. Id. (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281).
86. Id. The Court's placement of Bellas Hess within its historical review of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence is not satisfying. For example, while Bellas Hess is arguably not
inconsistent with Complete Auto-as Quill concludes-the Court's Commerce Clause analysis
in Bellas Hess did rely primarily on Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), a case which
Quill critiques. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756
(1967) ("As to the [Commerce Clause], the Court has held that 'State taxation falling on
interstate commerce . . . can only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a
fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys."') (quoting Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253). It is noteworthy that four of the nine Supreme Court Justices who
decided Quill disagreed with the Bellas Hess Commerce Clause analysis. See Quill, 112 S.
Ct. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting he would not "revisit
the merits" of the Commerce Clause holding of Bellas Hess); id. at 1916-22 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Rothfeld, supra note 15 at 1414-19 (arguing that
the Bellas Hess Commerce Clause holding was based upon an unsound doctrinal underpinning).
87. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
88. Id.
89. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
90. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912-13. The Court stated that in National Geographic Soc'y, it
"affirmed the continuing vitality of Bellas Hess' 'sharp distinction . . . between mail-order
sellers with [a physical presence in the taxing] State and those . . . who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general
interstate business."' Id. at 1912 (alteration in original) (quoting National Geographic Soc'y,
430 U.S. at 559). The Court also noted Goldberg v. Sweet, where it expressed 'doubt that
termination of an interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a
State to tax a call."' Id. at 1912 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989)).
Finally, the Court cited D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981); and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980). See Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912-13.
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b. An Evaluation of the Current Rule
After placing Bellas Hess within the framework of its Commerce
Clause cases, the Court proceeded to evaluate the argument that the
nexus requirement imposed by the Commerce Clause is identical to
that imposed by the Due Process Clause, and does not require physical presence in the taxing state." The Court rejected this argument.' It noted that the two requirements are distinct, and are motivated by different constitutional concerns." Specifically, due process
regulates the integral fairness of government action.' Thus, according to the Court, the core of the due process nexus analysis requires
an inquiry as to whether a person's connections with a state are
strong and substantial enough to support the government's exercise of
power over him.95 For this reason, the Court stated, it has often
identified "notice" or "fair warning" as the cornerstone of due process
analysis.96
On the other hand, the Commerce Clause's nexus requirement is
concerned less with fairness for the individual defendant than for the
national economic effect of state regulation.' According to the
Court, the Complete Auto four-part test adequately reflects the Commerce Clause's concerns for the nation's economy." For example,
the second and third parts, requiring fair apportionment and a nondiscriminatory purpose, prohibit taxes that unfairly shift the tax burden onto interstate commerce.' Moreover, the first and fourth
prongs-requiring substantial nexus with the state and a relationship
between a proposed tax and a state's services-limit the state's tax
reach and ensures that a tax does not unduly burden interstate commerce."l Thus, the Court stated, because Commerce Clause nexus is

91. See Quill, 112 S.Ct. at 1913.
92. See id.

93. Id
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98. See id.; see also text accompanying note 82.
99. Quill, 112 S.Ct. at 1913.
100. Id. The Court used North Dakota's use tax to illustrate how a state's taxation policy
might unduly burden interstate commerce. The North Dakota law imposed a collection duty
on every vendor who advertises in the state three times in a single year. Id. at 1913 n.6; see
supra text accompanying notes 36-38. Thus, the Court surmised that-absent the Bellas Hess
rule---"a publisher who included a subscription card in three issues of its magazine, a vendor
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concerned with limiting state burdens on interstate commerce, not

notice to a corporation, such corporation can have due process "minimum contacts" with a taxing state, but lack the substantial nexus required by the Commerce Clause.'
The United States Supreme Court noted that the North Dakota

Supreme Court had concluded that its recent Commerce Clause decisions signalled a "'retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive
approach."'' ' 2 While the Supreme Court agreed with this analysis, it
disagreed with the conclusion that the evolving case law effectively
overruled Bellas Hess. 3 In this regard, the Court noted that all of
the cases cited by the North Dakota court-unlike Bellas Hess--con-4
cerned taxpayers who were physically present in the taxing state10
Moreover, the Court stated-although its Commerce Clause jurispru-

dence now prefers a flexible balancing test-it has not rejected all

established "bright-line" tests. 5 The Court stated, "[a]lthough we
have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same
physical-presence requirement that. Bellas Hess established for sales
and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas
' 6
Hess rule.'""
The Court went on to evaluate the utility of the Bellas Hess

whose radio announcements were heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation whose telephone sales force made three calls into the State, all would be subject to the
collection duty." Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1913 n.6. More significantly the nation's other 6,000plus taxing jurisdictions could impose a similar tax obligation. Id.
101. Id. at 1913-14. The Court conceded that it has sometimes stated that the "Complete
Auto test, while responsive to Commerce Clause .dictates, encompasses as well . . . Due
Process requirement[s]." Id. at 1914 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting Trinova Corp. v.
Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 373 (1991)). However, it noted that, although
such comments suggest that every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is
also valid under the Due Process Clause, it does not follow that the converse is also true. I
d. (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232
(1987)).
102. Id. at 1914 (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 1991)). The
Court noted the North Dakota court's citation of Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975), and Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. 232. See Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1914.
103. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1914.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Court repeated substantially this same statement later in its opinion. See
infra note 122. This statement seems to undercut, to a certain extent, the claim of commentators who argue that the Quill physical presence test is the operative Commerce Clause test
outside the area of use tax.
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bright line rule."°c It noted that, while the Spector rule "served no
purpose within [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but stood 'only
as a trap for the unwary draftsman, ' "... Bellas Hess comports with
the intent of the dormant Commerce Clause.t" 9 According to the

Court, Bellas Hess creates a discrete realm of commercial activity that
is free from interstate taxation, "a safe harbor for vendors 'whose
only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common
carrier or the United States mail."' 110
The Court conceded that, like other bright-line tests, the Bellas

Hess rule appears "artificial at its edges," because factual distinctions
such as the presence of a small sales force, plant, or office in the
state may be determinative of the state's power to tax."' However,
the Court found that the benefits of a clear rule outweighed its artificiality."' Moreover, the Court noted that a bright line sales and use

tax rule solidifies settled expectations and therefore encourages investment by businesses and individuals."' As evidence of this tenet, the
court cited the Bellas Hess rule as the likely cause of the dramatic

107. Quill, 112 S.Ct. at 1914.
108. Id. (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
109. Id.
110. Id. (alteration in original). The Court concluded that Bellas Hess exempts such vendors from state-imposed sales and use taxes. Id. Applying the facts of the case at bar, the
Court noted that Quill had additional contacts with some of its North Dakota clients, since it
licensed software to them. Id. at 1914 n.8; see supra note 30. The Court concluded that
"[a]lthough title to 'a few floppy diskettes' present in a State might constitute some minimal
nexus," in National Geographic Soc'y, we expressly rejected a 'slightest presence" standard
of constitutional nexus."' Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1914 n.8 (citation omitted) (quoting National
Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977)).
Notwithstanding the Court's rejection of the "slightest presence" test in National Geographic Soc'y, that case upheld a use tax on a California corporation potentially in an
amount exceeding $180,000-based upon the presence in the state of two offices each with
between two to four persons. See National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 555 nn.2, 3. Moreover, the offices were engaged in soliciting advertisements and did not generally make sales.
See id. at 552.
111. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1914.
112. Id. at 1915. The benefits of a firm rule include clear boundaries as to when a state
may legitimately impose a duty to collect sales and use tax, and the reduction of litigation
concerning those taxes. The Court cited to Portland Cement for the proposition that such
guidance is important in the area of state taxes. Id.; see also Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
113. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915. The Court noted that Congress had previously followed a
similar approach. Id. at 1915 n.9 (citing Pub. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 381 (1988))). Public Law 86-272 applies to the sale of tangible personal property and
prevents a state from imposing a net income tax on a person whose "'only business activities
within such State [involve] the solicitation of orders [approved] outside the State [and]
filled . . . outside the State."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1988)).
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growth of the mail-order industry over the last twenty-five years." 4
The Court stated that, notwithstanding the benefits of bright-line
rules, it has sometimes replaced these rules with balancing tests."'
The Court gave as an example, Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp.
v. Arkansas Public Service Commission,"' where it rejected a
bright-line test previously articulated in Public Utilities Commission v.
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.' 7 In Arkansas Electric, the Court
rejected Attleboro's mechanical test, finding it to be "anachronistic,"
and further noted that-because it had "rarely relied on the

test"-rejecting the test would upset "no strong reliance interests."' '
In contrast, the rule in Bellas Hess was not formalistic," 9 was frequently relied upon by the Court in the twenty-five years after Bellas
Hess,' and "has engendered substantial reliance[,] the basic frame-

work of a sizeable industry.''. In the interest of order and stability-the bases for stare decisis-the Court therefore expressed a desire

to follow settled precedent."
In concluding its discussion of the Commerce Clause, the Court

114. Id. at 1915. By discussing the prior reliance of taxpayers in the context of its discussion of the benefits of the Quill bright-line physical presence rule, the Court suggests that
the arguments in favor of creating such a rule outside the area of use tax are weak. See
generally infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
115. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915.
116. 461 U.S. 375 (1983), cited in Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915.
117. 273 U.S. 83 (1927), cited in Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915.
118. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915 (quoting Arkansas Electric, 461 U.S. at 391). The
Attleboro mechanical test "distinguished between state regulation of wholesale sales of electricity, which was constitutional as an 'indirect' regulation of interstate commerce, and state
regulation of retail sales of electricity, which was unconstitutional as a 'direct regulation' of
commerce." Id. at 1915. The Court stated that this test was "'anachronistic' because it relied
on formal distinctions between 'direct' and 'indirect' regulation (and on the regulatory counterparts of [its] Freeman line of cases)." Id.; see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
119. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915. The Court's rationale was that the rule was consistent
with its contemporary Commerce Clause approach, as articulated in Complete Auto. Id; see
also supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
120. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1915-16. For this proposition, the Court cited several of its
prior cases, which it had cited earlier in Quill. See supra note 90.
121. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916.
122. Id. (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The Court also substantially repeated a statement which it had made previously in the
opinion that, "although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of
taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical presence requirement, our reasoning
in those cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in
the area of sales and use taxes." Id.; see supra note 106 and accompanying text. The Court
noted that, "[t]o the contrary, the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the
doctrine and principles of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law."
Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916 (emphasis in original).
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noted that its analysis was made easier by the fact that Congress
ultimately retained the power-and was in fact more competent-to
resolve the issues addressed." The Court observed that Congress

had considered many bills which would have overruled Bellas
Hess. It reasoned that Congress may have decided not to act because Bellas Hess held that the Due Process Clause, as well as the
Commerce Clause, mandated the Bellas Hess result-suggesting that
Bellas Hess could not be legislatively overruled."z The Court noted
that, subsequent to Quill, this would no longer be the case. 26 It
stated that, if it were "convinced that Bellas Hess was inconsistent

with our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 'this very fact [might] giv[e
us] pause and counse[l] withholding our hand, at least for now.""

7

123. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916. The Court noted that if it overruled Bellas Hess it could
create "thorny questions concerning the retroactive application of those taxes" which could
"trigger substantial unanticipated liability for mail order houses:' Id. at 1916 n.10. It stated
that Congress, rather than the Court, is in a better position to allocate such burdens. Id. An
attorney who represented Quill in the action has stated that it was on this retroactivity question that the case was decided:
You know why we won Quill? Because the Attorney General [of North
Dakota] stood before the Court and when Justice O'Connor asked "What do you
intend to do about past liability," said "We're going to collect every nickel that
we're entitled to." There went the Quill case down the tube.
See CCH Board Comments, supra note 8, at 7 (quoting comments of Jim Peters).
124. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916 & n.11.
125. Id. at 1916.
126. Id.
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana. 483 U.S.
609, 637 (1981)). Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas concurred in Quill's Commerce
Clause analysis, but on the basis of stare decisis and deference to Congress:
I also agree that the Commerce Clause holding of Bellas Hess should not
be overruled. Unlike the Court, however, I would not revisit the merits of that
holding, but would adhere to it on the basis of stare decisis. Congress has the
final say over regulation of interstate commerce, and it can change the rule of
Bellas Hess by simply saying so. We have long recognized that the doctrine of
stare decisis has "special force" where "Congress remains free to alter what we
have done." Moreover, the demands of the doctrine are "at their acme . . . where
reliance interests are involved." As the Court notes, "the Bellas Hess rule has
engendered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a
sizeable industry."
Id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted). The fact that
the five-Justice majority also relied heavily on this point suggests that the Court may not
quickly revisit its Quill interpretation of Commerce Clause nexus. See supra notes 122-26 and
accompanying text; see also CCH Board Comments, supra note 8, at 6 (quoting comments of
Alice Davis). This, in turn, explains why certiorari in Geoffrey may have been denied. See
id.; see also Walter Hellerstein, Supreme Court Says No State Use Tax Imposed on Mail
Order Sellers . . . For Now, 77 J. TAx'N 120, 123-24 (1992) (stating that the Court's
opinion in Quill may have been intended, as a practical matter, to elicit action by Congress).
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B. Analysis

Quill does not clearly resolve whether the Commerce Clause

"substantial nexus" test requires a corporation to be physically present
for taxing purposes where the tax is not a use tax.' On the one
hand, the Court makes clear that a physical presence requirement is

not inconsistent with its current jurisprudence'29 and is a "brightline" that, as such, has certain advantages."3 Moreover, the Court
observes that Bellas Hess, which was renowned for the physical presence requirement, was cited in numerous cases through the years,
including cases which did not pertain to a use tax."
On the other hand, the Court specifies that it never adopted a
physical presence requirement outside the realm of use tax,' and
that, generally, it has grown to disfavor bright-line rules.' More-

over, it states that, if the Bellas Hess physical presence issue arose
for the first time today, the result might not be the same."3 Together these statements suggest that the Court would be reluctant to formally extend the physical presence test outside the area of use
tax-particularly because the Court would like to defer to Congress in
this area of law.'35

For a historical analysis which argues that the Court should refrain from an activist approach
under the dormant Commerce Clause, see Tyler Pipe, Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
128. The general counsel of the Multistate Tax Commission has reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., Alan H. Friedman, Second Supplemental Report of Hearing Officer Regarding Proposed Adoption of Multistate Tax Commission Regulation IV.18.(j) (publishing), April
14, 1993, at 22-29; see also Hellerstein, supra note 127, at 124 (arguing that one plausible
interpretation of Quill-but not the only one-is that the physical presence rule applies only
to the mail order industry).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86 and 102-22.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 111-114. But see supra note 114.
131. See supra notes 90, 120 and accompanying text (referencing, inter alia, Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) and Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981)). Mobil Oil involved an income tax, see infra note 164, and Montana involved a coal severance tax. This point has been argued by persons who oppose the
result in Geoffrey. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 8, at 422 (noting that, prior to Quill, the
Supreme Court had cited Bellas Hess as authority for a number of income and other tax
cases).
132. The Court made this statement twice. See supra notes 106, 122 and accompanying
text.
133. See generally supra notes 102-22 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text accompanying note 87.
135. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. Another important consideration in
Quill was the reliance by taxpayers on the Bellas Hess rule. See supra notes 114-27 and
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However, even assuming that the physical presence rule articulated in Quill does apply to an income tax, that decision suggests that
this rule would-notwithstanding its literal language-permit the state
taxation of income based solely upon the situs of intangible property.

Significantly, this question was before the Court in Quill, since licensed software had formed a basis for the North Dakota Supreme
Court decision which the Court reviewed. 136 In response, the Court
stated, within the context of its Commerce Clause analysis, that, while
"a few floppy diskettes present in a State might constitute some minimal nexus," the property in question did not create nexus with North
Dakota because the Court-as stated in National Geographic-does
not recognize a "slightest presence standard of constitutional nexus." 37 This implies that if the intangible property used within North
Dakota in Quill were more significant, the admitted "nexus" with that
state would have surpassed the required constitutional threshold. Perhaps this inference is unintended, and is the result of the Court's
quick, footnoted disposition of this issue. However, it is noteworthy
that, in at least one other instance expressly approved by Quill-the

accompanying text; see also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5,
6.0811] (stating
that "in passing on corporate income and franchise taxes, the (supreme] Court may not be
faced with the same clear-cut expectation and stare decisis considerations that substantially
influenced the decision in the Quill case").
136. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 n.1 (1092). In this footnote, the Court cited to the following analysis by the North Dakota Supreme Court:
Quill has a further connection with North Dakota which supports a finding
of nexus. Quill licenses to some of its North Dakota customers a computer software program, Quill Service Link V"QSL"], which permits customers direct computer access to Quill's computer. This allows customers to check Quill's available
inventory, confirm current price, and order merchandise directly by computer. Customers with QSL can also communicate with Quill and others customers through
an electronic "bulletin board."
Quill retains all rights in QSL through the license agreement. Quill also
retains the right to terminate the license "forthwith without prior notice and without
cause," and upon termination the customer must "immediately return Software, and
copies thereof and the user documentation to Quill." The explicit terms of the
licensing agreement belie Quill's assertion that it merely sells the software-lock,
stock and barrel-to the customer. Through its licensing agreement, Quill clearly
retains rights to property situated in North Dakota, providing further nexus with the
State.
State v. Quill, 470 N.W.2d 203, 216-17 (N.D. 1991) (footnote omitted) (citing In re Heftel
Broadcasting Honolulu, Inc., 554 P.2d 242 (Haw. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977)).
Heftel is discussed infra note 222.
137. See supra note 110. The Court's reference to floppy disks in Quill referred to just
four floppy disks present in North Dakota. Telephone Interview with Alan H. Friedman (Feb.
8, 1994). Mr. Friedman was appointed Special Assistant North Dakota Attorney General in
connection with Quill.
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prior case of Scripto, Inc. v. Carson-the Court has determined that
the physical presence requirement was met, where the corporation in
question was not physically present in fact. 38 Thus, it seems that
Quill leaves open the possibility that the use of intangible property
within a state may create taxing nexus.'39
IV. GEOFFREY, INC. V. SOUTH CAROLINA TAX COMMISSION
A.

The Opinion

1. The Facts
Geoffrey, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toys R Us, Inc., was 14a
offices in that state.

Delaware corporation with its principal

Geoffrey did not maintain employees in South Carolina, nor did it
own any tangible property there) 41 In 1984, Toys R Us, Inc. granted Geoffrey ownership of several trademarks and trade names, including the valuable trade name, "Toys R Us.' ' 42 Later that year, Toys

138. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910; see also supra note 60. The Court's analysis in other

cases with respect to the unitary business principle similarly suggests that a corporation may
be subject to a state's income-based tax, even where that corporation is not physically present
in such state. See infra note 146.
139. See generally infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
140. Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 427 S.E.2d 13. 15 (S.C. 1993).
141. Id.
142. Id. Geoffrey would not be taxed on its income in Delaware because that state provides for tax-free treatment for corporations whose activities within the state "are confined to
the maintenance and management of their intangible investments," such as trademarks. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (Supp. 1992). Toys R Us, Inc. freely acknowledged in
its petition to the United States Supreme Court seeking certiorari for Geoffrey that it selected
Delaware as the incorporation state for its licensing subsidiary because the incorporation in
that state would minimize taxes:
By holding the trademarks in Geoffrey, and having Geoffrey license the trademarks
for a royalty to [Toys R Us, Inc.], its affiliates, and unrelated parties, [Toys R Us,
Inc.] could reduce its state tax liability without any offsetting increase in
Geoffrey's tax liability if (1) Geoffrey were located in a state that did not tax its
income, and (2) [Toys R Us, Inc.] operated in a state that measured its tax liability without combining its income with that of its affiliates, such as Geoffrey ...
In light of these potential state tax savings, when [Toys R Us. Inc.] created
Geoffrey in January 1984, it chose to establish it in Delaware.
Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5 at 4. Tax practitioners suggest this type of tax manipulation. See Ira H. Rosen, Use of a Delaware Holding Company to Save State Income Taxes,

20 TAx ADVISER 180 (1989); see also Mark J. Christopher & Barbara J. Janaszek, Limitations on State Income Taxation of Interstate Business After Wrigley and Quill, 11 J. ST.

TAX'N 9, 20 (1993) (noting Geoffrey to be illustrative of a specific type of tax planning).
For an analysis of the principle that permits the states to measure the income tax liability of
a corporation by combining the income of that corporation with its affiliates (i.e., taxation
using the unitary business principle), see infra note 146.
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R Us, Inc. and Geoffrey entered into a license agreement ("the
Agreement"), allowing Toys R Us, Inc. to use the trade name Toys R
Us, as well as other trademarks and trade names in South Carolina
and forty-four other states. 4 3 The Agreement also gave Toys R Us,
Inc. a right to use Geoffrey's "merchandising skills, techniques, and

'know-how' in connection with marketing, promotion, advertising, and
sale of products covered by the Agreement.""'
In return for the licenses granted by the Agreement, Geoffrey
received a royalty calculated as a percentage of the pertinent net
sales.'45 Pursuant to the Agreement, Toys R Us, Inc. reported its

aggregate sales to Geoffrey on a monthly basis, and paid the royalty
annually from its account in Pennsylvania to Geoffrey's New York
account.146 Toys R Us, Inc. began paying royalties to Geoffrey

143. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 15. The excluded states were New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Jersey. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The royalty was "one percent 'of the net sales of [Toys R Us, Inc.] or any of
its affiliated, associated, or subsidiary companies .
I...'
Id. These payments applied to sales
of products or services covered by the licensed mark. Id.
146. Id. The court noted that this corporate structure effectively produced "nowhere"
income, escaping all state income taxation. See id. at 15 n.l (observing, in addition, that
Geoffrey had an income of $55 million in 1990 and paid no income taxes to any state). See
supra note 142. Some states, however, impose tax using the unitary business principle, which
provides that separate entities engaged in a unitary or single business may be required to
report their income on a combined basis. Under this approach, a corporation that has nexus
with a given state can effectively cause a unitary affiliate to be subject to tax-though only
on the portion of its income which is objectively determined to be within the borders of the
taxing state. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2272-73 (1994).
This methodology helps prevent tax manipulation, which is prevalent in the use of separate
accounting. See id. Thus, notwithstanding the statement on "nowhere" income by the South
Carolina Supreme Court, it is possible that Toys R Us, Inc., Geoffrey's parent, was required
to account for a portion of Geoffrey's income in states other than South Carolina. See
Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5, at 6 n.8 (suggesting that Toys R Us, Inc. did file such
combined reports, without stating to what extent). For a survey of the states' rules on combined reporting, see 1 All States Executive Summaries State Tax Guide (CCH)
10-115.
The Supreme Court has recently suggested that a corporation may have nexus with a
state under the unitary business principle, notwithstanding the fact that the corporation is not
physically present in such state. See Barclays Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 2276 (noting that, under
the unitary business principle, the nexus requirement is met by the business which the corporation does in the taxing state). In Barclays Bank, the Court rejected the claim that California
did not have nexus with a corporation as required by Quill-even though the corporation,
unlike a unitary affiliate, was not physically present in the state:
Quill held that the Commerce Clause requires a taxpayer's "physical presence" in
the taxing jurisdiction before that jurisdiction can constitutionally impose a use tax.
The California presence of the [two affiliate] taxpayers before us is undisputed, and
we find nothing in Quill to suggest that California may not reference the income
of corporations worldwide with whom those taxpayers are closely intertwined in
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based upon its South Carolina sales in 1985, the year it began conducting business in the state. 47 In 1986 and 1987, Toys R Us, Inc.

deducted the royalty payments from its South Carolina taxable income.'4 8 While the South Carolina Tax Commission first contested
this deduction, it later allowed Toys R Us, Inc. the deduction and
required Geoffrey to pay South Carolina income tax on the royalty
income.' Geoffrey contested this determination, partly claiming that
it lacked the required state nexus for South Carolina to tax its royalty

income. 5 °
As a threshold matter, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted
that the state's corporate income tax statute reached the income in

question.'

The Court then went on to consider whether, notwith-

order to approximate the taxpayers' California income.
Barclays Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 2277 n.10. For a discussion of the application of the unitary
method of taxation, see generally I JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION
8.12 (2d. ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN].
147. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
148. Id.
149. Id. The Commission's initial position was that Toys R Us, Inc. was not entitled to
deduct the royalties it had paid to Geoffrey because Geoffrey was "a paper corporation" and
the royalty expenses paid to Geoffrey entailed an "arbitrary shift" of income and expenses.
See Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5, at 6. The Commission reversed course after Toys R
Us, Inc. protested the initial methodology, arguing, among other things, that there was no
basis for disregarding Geoffrey as a separate corporate entity, or for questioning the fairness
of the royalty payments made by Toys R Us, Inc. to Geoffrey. Id. The notice of assessment
issued to Geoffrey was for $10,612, plus interest. Id. at 7.
150. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 15. The South Carolina statute does not authorize combined
reporting, and, as a consequence, the state does not utilize the unitary business principle. See
supra note 146. Kevin Brown suggests the theory that where two corporations are engaged in
a unitary business, but only one is physically present in the taxing state-that is, the apparent
situation in Geoffrey-nexus may exist as to the corporation which is not physically present,
whether or not the state asserts tax using the unitary business principle. Interviews with
Kevin W. Brown, Deputy Chief, Rulings and Regulations Bureau, Massachusetts Department
of Revenue (Nov.-Dec., 1993). That is, the constitutional pre-requisite for the imposition of a
tax should not be dependent upon the taxing statute of the state in question. See Barclays,
114 S. Ct. at 2276 n.10 (stating that the theory which underlies unitary taxation is that "'certainintangible "flows of value" within the unitary group serve to link the various members
together as if they were essentially a single entity."'); see also Rosen & Bernstein, supra
note 60. at 581-82 (discussing the unitary basis for attributional nexus); Sheppard, supra note
5, at 37 (stating that Geoffrey was an easy case because it involved a controlled corporation).
Geoffrey also involved a dispute over a minimum corporate license fee, which was
based upon capital employed within South Carolina, and was $15 per year for the periods
ending January 31, 1987 and January 31, 1988. See Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5, at 7
n.9. Geoffrey objected to the imposition of this license fee on the same grounds that it objected to the South Carolina income tax. See id.
151. Geoffiey, 437 S.E.2d at 15. The court noted that the South Carolina statute "levies
a tax on the income of foreign corporations 'transacting, conducting, doing business, or hay-
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standing this fact, the Due Process
Clause or the Commerce Clause
152
barred the imposition of the tax.
2. The Due Process Clause
Geoffrey began its due process analysis by stating the applicable
two requirements set forth in Quill: (1) that there be "'some definite
link, some minimum connection between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,"' and (2) that the "'income attributed to the state for tax purposes must be rationally related to values
connected with the taxing State." ' 5' As to the former "minimum

connections" requirement, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted
that, under Quill, this requirement can be satisfied even where a cor-

poration that is not physically present in the state purposefully directs

its activity into the state's economic marketplace." 4
Geoffrey argued that, because it had no South Carolina stores
when it entered into the Agreement with Toys R Us, Inc., it did not
purposefully direct business activity into South Carolina and that its
parent company's unilateral expansion into the state could not create
the requisite minimum connection. 55 The South Carolina court declined to characterize Geoffrey's contact as unwilling or the unilateral
product of an independent party.' 56 It noted that Geoffrey's business

was the ownership, licensing, and management of intellectual property, and that by licensing its trademarks and trade names for use by
Toys R Us, Inc. in many states, Geoffrey consciously and intentional-

ing an income within the jurisdiction of this State,' which, 'includes,' but is not limited to,
'the engaging in or the transacting of any activity in this State for the purpose of financial
profit or gain."' Id. at 15-16 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-230 (Supp. 1992)). The court
construed this language to extend South Carolina's authority to tax foreign corporations to the
limits of the U.S. constitution. Id. at 16.
152. Id. at 16-19.
153. Id. at 16 (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909-10 (1992)).
154. Id. (citing Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909-10).
155. Id. In its subsequent petition submitted to the Supreme Court seeking certiorari for
Geoffrey, the taxpayer analogized its situation to that in Asahi Metal Industries Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5, at 15-17. In
that case, a plurality decision, the Court stated that "a defendant's awareness that the stream
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere
act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum
State." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. By way of analogy, Geoffrey argued that, "by licensing [Toys
R Us, Inc.] to use its trademarks, Geoffrey was merely releasing its intangible 'product' into
the stream of commerce" and that "[w]hether that 'product' would find its way into South
Carolina was wholly within the control of [Toys R Us, Inc.]." Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra
note 5, at 16-17.
156. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16.
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5 7 Addily sought the economic benefit of contact with those states."

tionally, Geoffrey could have prohibited the use of its intangible
property in South Carolina as it did in other states, and therefore
controlled its contact with South Carolina.' The court held that "by

licensing intangibles for use in South Carolina and receiving income
in exchange for their use, Geoffrey has the 'minimum connection'
with this State that is required by due process."'59
The court also concluded that Geoffrey's ownership of intangible

property in South Carolina-that is, an account receivable on the
books of Toys R Us, Inc. generated by South Carolina sales and a
Toys R Us franchise located within that state-satisfied the minimum

connection test."

In reaching this conclusion, the court relied pri-

157. Id. The court added that, "Geoffrey has been aware of, consented to, and benefitted
from [Toys R Us, Inc.'s] use of Geoffrey's intangibles in South Carolina." Id.
158. Id.; see supra note 143 and accompanying text. The Agreement also required Toys
R Us, Inc. to submit samples of products and advertising to Geoffrey for its approval, which
approval could not be unreasonably withheld. See Final Supplemental Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Geoffrey v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993) (No. 92-569)
[hereinafter Geoffrey Brief] (citing section 6.3 of the Agreement). In addition, the Agreement
provided that, in the event of any infringement of Geoffrey's trademarks or symbols,
Geoffrey had the right to bring suit in South Carolina to protect this property. See Brief in
Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of
Revenue and Taxation, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993) (No. 93-520), reprinted in 5 STATE TAX
NOTEs 1251, 1252 (1993). Geoffrey argued that this latter right was of little practical utility.
See Geoffrey Brief, supra at 4; see also Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5, at 3 n.4 (noting
that all of Geoffrey's outstanding trademark suits at the time of its initial hearing in South
Carolina were in federal court).
159. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16. The court cited two New Mexico cases for this proposition: American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 605 P.2d 251 (N.M.
1979) and AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 600 P.2d 841 (N.M.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 598 P.2d 1165 (N.M. 1979). The cases are discussed infra note 176.
In general, it is difficult to quarrel with the court's analysis of purposeful direction
and minimum contacts, as discussed in this paragraph of the text. During the years in question, Toys R Us, Inc. was the world's largest retailer of children's toys. See Geoffrey Cert.
Brief, supra note 5, at 2-3. Though the Agreement did not specifically reference sales to be
made in South Carolina, clearly they were intended, as they were in forty-four other states
(i.e., every state other than those which were expressly precluded by the Agreement). See
supra note 143 and accompanying text. But see supra note 155 (discussing the taxpayer's
argument).
160. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16. The court quoted the definition of the term "franchise"
from Black's Law Dictionary:
"In its simplest terms, a franchise is a license from the owner of a trademark or trade name permitting another to sell a product or service under that
name or mark. More broadly stated, a 'franchise' has evolved into an elaborate
agreement under which the franchisee undertakes to conduct a business or sell a
product or service in accordance with methods and procedures prescribed by the
franchisor, and the franchisor undertakes to assist the franchisee through advertising,
promotion, and other advisory services."
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marily on Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., Inc, 161 for the proposition that intangible property may have a taxable presence within a
state. 62 In addition, the court relied on Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes 3 for the rule that intangible property may be taxed
at more than one situs.'" Finally, Geoffrey also relied on Wheeling

Id. at 16 n.2 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (5th ed. 1979)). The court further
noted that Geoffrey did not contest the trial judge's finding that the Agreement created a
franchise. Id. For a discussion on the difference between a franchise and a license, see 1
LAWRENCE J. ECKSTROM, LICENSING IN FOREIGN & DOMESTIC OPERArIONS § 1.02[3] (1988
& Supp. 1993).
161. 293 U.S. 15 (1934).
162. In Imperial Coal, the Supreme Court sustained, against a Due Process and Commerce Clause challenge, an ad valorem property or "capital" tax imposed upon money and
accounts receivable (less accounts payable) located within the taxpayer-corporation's domicile
state. Id. at 18-20. The Court concluded that this intangible property had a taxable situs
within the state, since that was where the corporation's principal offices were located and
where the proceeds of its accounts receivable were collected and deposited in the bank. Id. at
19-20. Geoffrey determined that, while Imperial Coal pertained to a property tax, it also
applied to an income tax, since Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920), extends the authority to tax property to the income produced by that property. See Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at
17 n.3. It is noteworthy that, while this interpretation of Shaffer seems correct, Shaffer did
not pertain to a situation involving intangible property. See infra note 233 and accompanying
text.
163. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
164. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 17. In contrast to Geoffrey, Mobil Oil was concerned, not
with a state's ability to levy a tax upon the corporation in question, but rather with the restrictions which apply to the state's legitimate taxing power. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992) (noting these to be two distinct constitutional questions). In Mobil Oil, the taxpayer argued that the dividends received by a
corporation which was physically present in Vermont could not be taxed by that state because such dividends were taxable only in the state from which they were derived (i.e., the
state of their "business situes") or, alternatively, the state in which the corporation maintained
its commercial headquarters (i.e., the state of the corporation's commercial domicile). Mobil
Oil, 445 U.S. at 436; see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing the "business
situs rule") and infra note 196 (discussing the "commercial domicile rule"). The Court rejected this argument, stating the following language which was quoted in Geoffrey:
Although a fictionalized situs for intangible property sometimes has been invoked
to avoid multiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing talismanic about the concepts of "business situs" or "commercial domicile" that automatically renders those
concepts applicable when taxation of income from intangibles is at issue. The
Court has observed that the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, upon which these
fictions of situs are based, "states a rule without disclosing the reasons for it." The
Court also has recognized that "the reason for a single place of taxation no longer
obtains" when the taxpayer's activities with respect to the intangible property involve relations with more than one jurisdiction. Even for property or franchise taxes, [multi-state] apportionment of intangible values is not unknown. Moreover,
cases upholding allocation to a single situs for property tax purposes have distinguished income tax situations where the [multi-state] apportionment principle prevails.
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Steel Corp. v. Fox,"6 for the proposition that intangible property
"may acquire a situs for taxation other than at the domicile of the
owner if they have become integral parts of some local business.""
The court also found that South Carolina had conferred benefits
upon Geoffrey that were rationally related to the challenged tax, thus
satisfying the second part of the Quill test. 67 That is, the court noted that Geoffrey's source of income was the South Carolina customers of Toys R Us, Inc., not the paper Agreement which had been
executed by the parties. 6 ' The court stated:
That Geoffrey has received protection, benefits, and opportunities
from South Carolina is manifested by the fact that it earns income
in this state. That the tax is rationally related to these protections,
benefits, and opportunities is evidenced by the fact that the State
seeks to tax only that portion of Geoffrey's income generated within
its borders."6
3. The Commerce Clause
Geoffrey proceeded to its Commerce Clause analysis, and began
by re-stating the four-part test taken by Quill from Complete Auto. 7 The court then evaluated Geoffrey's claim that it did not have

Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 445 (citations omitted), quoted in Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 17.
165. 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
166. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 17. Wheeling Steel, which was not a nexus case per se, is
discussed infra note 196.
167. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 17. To support this point, the court stated:
Very different considerations, both theoretical and practical, apply to the taxation of
intangibles, that is, rights which are not related to physical things. Such rights are
but relationships between persons, natural or corporate, which the law recognizes
by attaching to them certain sanctions enforceable in courts. The power of government over them and the protection which it gives them cannot be exerted
through control of a physical thing. They can be made effective only through control over and protection afforded to those persons whose relationships are the
origin of the rights .... Obviously, as sources of actual or potential

wealth-which is an appropriate measure of any tax imposed on ownership or its
exercise-they cannot be dissociated from the persons from whose relationships
they are derived.

Id. at 17-18 (alterations in original) (quoting Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-66
(1939)). Curry is discussed infra note 179.
168. Geoffrey, 427 S.E.2d at 18. The court also stated that "[b]y providing an orderly
society in which Toys R Us conducts business, South Carolina has made it possible for
Geoffrey to earn income pursuant to the royalty agreement." Id.
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. A tax withstands a Commerce Clause challenge if it (1) is applied to an activity
having a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not dis-
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substantial nexus with South Carolina because it lacked a physical
presence there. 7 ' According to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
Geoffrey's reliance upon the physical presence requirement was misplaced.'
It noted in a footnote that while Quill re-affirmed the
physical presence requirement for sales and use taxes, that decision
expressly noted that this requirement has not been extended to other
types of taxes.
Geoffrey then stated that a person need not be physically present
in a state for its income to be taxed by the state and that "[t]he presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus."'74
For the latter proposition, the court cited American Dairy Queen
Corp. v. Taxation and Revenue Department,75 a New Mexico case
which held that New Mexico could tax a franchisor which was not
physically present in the state on license fees paid by unaffiliated, instate franchisees. 6 For supporting authority, the court cited International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation." Final-

criminate against interstate commerce, and (4) fairly relates to the services the state provides.
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992); see also text accompanying
notes 81-82.
171. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 18 n.4.
174. Id. at 18.
175. 605 P.2d 251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
176. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18. In American Dairy Queen, which involved facts similar
to Geoffrey, the New Mexico court adopted its Due Process and Commerce Clause analyses
from Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. Revenue Div., 599 P.2d 1098 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979),
and AAMCO Transmissions, Inc v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 600 P.2d 841 (N.M. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 598 P.2d 1165 (N.M. 1979). See American Dairy Queen, 605 P.2d at
255. Baskin-Robbins concluded that royalties received for trademarks and other intangibles by
an out-of-state corporation without physical presence in the taxing state did not constitute
"interstate commerce" and, therefore, failed to implicate the Commerce Clause. See BaskinRobbins, 599 P.2d at 1101-02. But see supra text accompanying notes 71-82 (discussing the
Court's current Commerce Clause test). Moreover, AAMCO Transmissions validated a tax with
respect to similar facts under both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause because
the tax was not discriminatory and met with the economic benefits test, as referenced by the
Supreme Court in Curry v. McCanless. AAMCO Transmissions, 600 P.2d at 844-45 (quoting,
inter alia, the economic benefits language stated in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. at 357,
367-68 (1939)). The Curry language, quoted in AAMCO Transmissions, is quoted infra note
179. For a discussion of the economic benefits test, see supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
177. 322 U.S. 435 (1944). International Harvester, like the prior case of Wisconsin v.
J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940), involved a due process challenge to an attempt by
Wisconsin to tax dividends declared by a Delaware corporation with a principal office in
New York. The dividends were declared in New York, but because the corporation's business
activities were located in Wisconsin, these dividends were with respect to Wisconsin income.
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ly, the court quoted Curry v. McCanless," for the proposition that
"[a] taxpayer who is domiciled in one state but carries on business in
another is subject to taxation measured by the value of the intangibles
used in his business."'' The court held, that by licensing intangible

J.C. Penney determined that the tax was a corporate tax, notwithstanding its effect on the
corporation's shareholders. Id. at 442. Given this determination, J.C. Penney did not involve a
nexus question, since the corporation was doing business in-and indeed was physically present in-Wisconsin. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 63 (quoting oft-repeated language
from J.C Penney).
Three years later, in InternationalHarvester, the Court revisited the due process question first addressed in J.C. Penney, this time after a determination by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court that the tax in question was a shareholder tax-not a corporate tax-and therefore not
allowable as a state corporate tax deduction. See Int'l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 438-39. The
issue in International Harvester was whether Wisconsin could tax non-resident shareholders
on dividends declared out-of-state, where the dividends were with respect to income derived
in Wisconsin. See id. at 439. The Court's analysis was two-pronged. First, notwithstanding
the characterization by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it reiterated its J.C. Penney view that
the tax in question was a tax upon the corporation, and therefore generally re-incorporated its
prior analysis. See id. at 441. Second, as to the fact that the burden of the tax fell upon the
corporation's shareholders, the Court stated:
The power to tax the corporation's earnings includes the power to postpone
the tax until the distribution of those earnings, and to measure it by the amount
distributed. In taxing such distributions, Wisconsin may impose the burden of the
tax either upon the corporation or upon the stockholders who derive the ultimate
benefit from the corporation's Wisconsin activities. Personal presence within the
state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to the constitutional levy of a tax
taken out of so much of the corporation's Wisconsin earnings as is distributed to
them. A state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the state or to events or transactions which,
occurring there, are subject to state regulation and which are within the protection
of the state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it confers.
Id. at 441-42 (citations omitted). Geoffrey relied upon the final sentence in this quote, taken
out of its fact-specific context. See Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18; see also HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 146, 6.09 n.76 (noting that this sentence reflects a broad interpretation of the rule permitting taxation of a non-resident's income); supra note 25 (noting the
similarity of this sentence in International Harvester to commonly-invoked language in J.C.
Penney).
178. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
179. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting Curry, 307 U.S. at 368). This quotation was
dictum in Curry, which concerned a due process claim, since the taxes there were imposed
upon intangible property which was not used in the taxpayer's business. See Curry, 307 U.S.
at 368 (stating that "there are many circumstances in which more than one state may have
jurisdiction to impose a tax and measure it by some or all of the taxpayer's intangibles"). In
particular, Curry involved an attempt by two states to tax a distribution of stocks and bonds.
Id. at 360-61. The assets were owned by a decedent who was a resident of one state, and
held by a trustee who was a resident of the other. Id. The Court concluded that the intangibles could be taxed by both states, stating that:
[W]hen the taxpayer extends his activities with respect to his intangible property,
so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of another state, in
such a way as to bring his person or property within the reach of the tax gatherer
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property for use in South Carolina, and by earning income from its
use, Geoffrey acquired a substantial nexus with that state."
B. Analysis
To a certain extent, Geoffrey's two constitutional nexus analyses-under the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause-overlap. In resolving whether Geoffrey had minimum contacts with South Carolina as required for purposes of due process
nexus, the court looked both to the fact that Geoffrey contemplated
prospective business in South Carolina, 8 ' and the fact that its intangible property was located in that state." 2 Then, in resolving whether Geoffrey had substantial nexus with South Carolina for purposes of
Commerce Clause nexus, the court again focused on the situs of the
intangible property.' The difficulty with this latter approach is that
Quill suggests that Commerce Clause nexus, or "substantial nexus,"
requires physical presence-at least in the context of a use tax, and
maybe otherwise.' However, in contrast to this, Geoffrey concluded
that it is well-settled that physical presence is not required for the

there, the reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains.
Id. at 367-68; see also supra note 164 (quoting similar language in the more recent case of
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)). Thus, Curry suggests that
income derived from intangible property can be taxed to a person, even though that person is
not physically located in the taxing state. See infra note 233 and accompanying text; see also
Kathleen L. Roin, Note, Due Process Limits on State Estate Taxation: An Analogy to the
State Corporate Income Tax, 94 YALE LJ. 1229, 1233 (1985) (stating that, notwithstanding
Curry, "[o]f the forty-nine states that levy an estate tax, forty-eight have effectively declared
that only the state of domicile may levy an estate tax").
180. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18. In a footnote, the court declined to further discuss the
remaining requirements of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 18 n.5. It stated that Geoffrey failed
to argue that the challenged tax was not fairly apportioned or that it discriminated against
interstate commerce (i.e., prongs two and three of the Complete Auto test). Id. Moreover, it
stated that its due process analysis of the benefits conferred upon Geoffrey, see supra notes
167-69 and accompanying text, applied with equal force to its Commerce Clause analysis and
did not have to be repeated. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18 n.5. Because the court addressed the
first, "substantial nexus" requirement of the Complete Auto test, and the second and third
requirements did not apply, the court suggests that it invoked its due process "benefits" analysis to satisfy the fourth requirement of Complete Auto-that the tax be fairly related to the
services provided by the state. The literal language of this fourth requirement is similar to
the second requirement under the Due Process Clause (i.e., that "the income attributed to the
state for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state").
See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
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purpose of an income tax, as opposed to a use tax.

'

In general, Geoffrey relies on two theories as to why Geoffrey's
intangible property acquired a legal situs in South Carolina: 1) because it was afforded the benefits, protection and opportunities of the
state, 186 and 2) because it was used in a local business there.18
Both theories are founded in due process analysis, but the former
theory is broader, and could apply theoretically even where a corpora-

tion has no property interest or business within the taxing state. Thus,
in the abstract, it seems less likely that an activity which merely
meets with the economic benefits test-as opposed to a situation
involving the presence of intangible property-would meet with the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause requirement of substantial nexus.
Indeed, Quill seems tacitly to reject the economic benefits test under
its Commerce Clause analysis-at least in the context of a use
tax. "88
' This is because the benefits bestowed by North Dakota in
Quill were significant, and the economic benefits test was expressly

relied upon by the North Dakota Supreme Court in upholding the use
tax which the Supreme Court then struck down."9 In contrast, Quill

185. See supra text accompanying note 174.
186. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 180.
188. However, Quill used the economic benefits language in its due process analysis. See
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.Ct 1904, 1910 (1992) ("Applying these principles, we
have held that if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State's . . . jurisdiction even if
it has no physical presence in the State.") (referencing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985)). Moreover, the economic benefits test may have continuing application under
the Commerce Clause outside the area of use tax. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992) ("We are guided by the basic principle that the
State's power to tax an individual's or corporation's activities is justified by the 'protection,
opportunities and benefits' the State confers on those activities.") (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)) (evaluating, generally, an income tax under both the
Due Process and Commerce Clause)); see generally infra note 215.
189. See State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 216-19 (N.D. 1991). Specifically, the
court noted that the state created the economic climate which fostered demand for Quill's
products, and disposed of 24 tons of solid waste contributed annually to North Dakota's
landfills by Quill's catalogs and fliers. Id. at 218-19. Moreover, the state courts provided the
only means by which a mail order vendor could enforce its legal rights against a delinquent
or fraudulent buyer. Id. at 218 (noting also that the state's consumer protection and usury
laws governing mail order sales created important consumer confidence with respect to such
sales). The court noted several of the various articles by commentators who had argued in
favor of finding nexus based upon a state's provision of economic benefits, and quoted at
length from Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax, supra note 15. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 21718; see also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 146, 1 6.08 (arguing in favor of an
economic-based standard); Marcus, supra note 59, 310.6 (same).
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evaluated, but did not resolve, the question of whether application of
the business situs rule can create nexus. In this regard, the Court
suggested that the mere ownership of intangible property within a
state can satisfy the nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause-but

only in the instance where this ownership interest is more than de
minimis.' 9 In the following section, this Article evaluates whether

the "business situs" of intangible property can justify a finding of
nexus in a situation like Geoffrey, or otherwise.
V. THE BUSINESS Srrus RULE
A determination as to whether the use of intangible property
within a state can supply nexus under the business situs rule must
logically begin with the line of analysis used by the Supreme Court
in Quill. This line of analysis focused primarily on prior Supreme
Court precedent, reliance interests, and public policy."9 ' The use of

this approach suggests that the business situs of intangible property
can create constitutional taxing nexus.
A. Supreme Court Authority
The business situs rule dates back to five turn-of-the-century
Supreme Court cases involving a due process challenge to an ad
valorem tax."9 In each case the challenged tax pertained to notes or
receivables "sitused" in the taxing state, which were derived from
lending activity by an out-of-state individual or corporation.'
The

190. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
191. See generally supra notes 102-27 and accompanying text.
192. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 146, 9.031]. An ad valorem property tax is a tax imposed upon the value of property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51
(6th ed. 1990). As noted, there were five Supreme Court cases which created the business
situs rule. See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346
(1911); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907); State Bd. of Assessors v. Comptoir Nat'l D'Escompte, 191 U.S. 388 (1903); Bristol v. Washington County, 177
U.S. 133 (1900); New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899). These cases are discussed in
detail in Thomas R. Powell, The Business Situs of Credits, 28 W. VA. L.Q. 89 (1922).
193. The corporate cases were Metropolitan and Liverpool. Four of the five cases--all

but Bristol-involved an 1898 Louisiana statute, or its substantially similar predecessor. See
Liverpool, 221 U.S. at 349-52. The Louisiana tax as applied to the corporations in Metropolitan and Liverpool resembled, conceptually, the capital stock tax applied to Geoffrey by
South Carolina-though the South Carolina statute did not apply to the Geoffrey receivables.
See supra note 150; see also HELLERSMIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 146, 1 11.01 (referencing the fact that capital stock taxes are derived from property taxes). For a discussion of
the different types of capital stock taxes, see HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMrrATIONS, supra note 9,
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persons taxed were not physically present in the taxing state, but the
taxes were upheld, in part because the receivables taxed derived from
a business located within the state."9 In a subsequent case, Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,"5 the Court cited the five early business situs cases for the proposition that "choses in action may acquire a
situs for taxation other than at the domicile of their owner if they
have become integral parts of some local business."'9
1. Income Tax: New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves
The first Supreme Court case to apply the business situs doctrine
to state income tax was New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves.'97
Whitney involved a due process challenge to a New York income tax,
which was applied to a Massachusetts resident not physically present
in New York. The tax was imposed with respect to the sale of a
right owned by the taxpayer which was derived from his seat on the
§ 11.1.
194. See Powell, supra note 192, at 106. Liverpool applied the prior four cases to its
facts:
Tested by the criteria afforded by the authorities we have cited, Louisiana must be
deemed to have had jurisdiction to impose the tax. The credits would have had no
existence save for permission of Louisiana; they issued from the business transacted
under her sanction within her borders; the sums were payable by persons domiciled
within the State, and there the rights of the creditor were to be enforced. If locality, in the sense of subjection to sovereign power, could be attributed to these credits, they could be localized there. If, as property, they could be deemed to be
taxable at all, they could be taxed there.
Liverpool, 221 U.S. at 354-55.
195. 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
196. Id. at 210 (quoting Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213
(1930)). Geoffrey relied upon this line in Wheeling Steel. See supra text accompanying note
166. While this characterization of the prior Supreme Court cases seems significant, there was
no nexus question in Wheeling Steel, since the corporation in question was physically present
in the taxing state. Wheeling Steel held that a state could impose an ad valorem property tax
on accounts receivable and bank accounts, where the commercial headquarters of the corporation was located in-state but its business operations and state of incorporation were elsewhere.
See Wheeling Steel, 298 U.S. at 211-15. The rationale for this holding was that the
corporation's contracts were finalized by its executives at the in-state office. See id. at 21213. The notion that a corporation's intangible property and the income derived therefrom is
taxable by the state where the corporation's headquarters is located is often referred to as the
"commercial domicile rule." This rule and its potential overlap with the business situs rule is
discussed in HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 146, l 9.0312], [3].
197. 299 U.S. 366 (1937). See Recent Case, Taxation-Jurisdictionto Tax Nonresident on
Income from Sale of Right to Seat on Stock Exchange Located in State, 50 HARV. L. REV.
704 (1937). This work notes, perhaps prophetically, "[i]t
is significant with regard to possible
future limitations on jurisdiction to impose income taxes that the Court did not hesitate in
placing an income tax case within an exception established by inheritance and property tax
cases." Id. at 705.
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New York Stock Exchange.'98 The taxpayer disputed the tax and
contended that the business situs rule did not apply to intangible
property in a state where the owner neither lived nor transacted business."9 Whitney rejected the taxpayer's arguments and broadly embraced the business situs rule in the context of income tax. The Court
stated:
When we speak of a "business situs" of intangible property in the
taxing State we are indulging in a metaphor. We express the idea of
localization by virtue of the attributes of the intangible right in
relation to the conduct of affairs at a particular place. The right
may grow out of the actual transactions of a localized business or
the right may be identified with a particular place because the exercise of the right is fixed exclusively or dominantly at that place. In
the latter case the localization for the purpose of transacting business may constitute a business situs quite as clearly as the conduct
of the business itself.'
The analysis in Whitney suggests that the taxpayer was taxable in
New York even though he transacted no business there.2"' Thus,
Whitney not only recognized the business situs rule as viable in the
area of income tax, it seemingly broadened the rule in this context. 2"

198. In particular, the interest was the right to a percentage in a new membership on the
Exchange which the taxpayer pQssessed by reason of his pre-existing membership. The right
existed because the Exchange was increasing its membership and gave existing members a
stake in this expansion. Whitney, 299 U.S. at 369.
199. Id. at 367, 372. The facts supported the taxpayer's claim that he did not do business in New York. While the taxpayer and his partners accepted orders from customers in
Boston for execution on the Exchange, they made none of the actual purchases and sales, but
rather telegraphed other members of the Exchange who executed the orders in their own
names for a reduced fee. Id. at 371. Moreover, neither the taxpayer, nor his partners, bought
or sold securities on the Exchange for their own accounts. Id.
200. Id. at 372.
201. The Exchange interest in Whitney met the Court's test because the "privilege of
conducting the business of . . . buying and selling . . . securities on the floor of the Exchange [was] the dominant feature of the membership or 'seat."' Id. at 373. Moreover, this
privilege was localized in New York since it could be exercised there, but nowhere else. Id.
In addition, "[tihe nature of [the] right [was] not altered by the [taxpayer's] failure to exercise it" Id.
202. The Court's prior business situs rulings in the area of property tax seemed to suggest that a tax could be applied to credits and other intangible property only where such
property was incident to a regular and continuous business. See Powell, supra note 192, at
106; Recent Case, supra note 197, at 704-05. However, while Whitney determined that the
mere presence of a right which was exercisable for the purpose of conducting business could
confer nexus, the case suggests that not every such right would in fact do so. See Whitney,
299 U.S. at 372 ("Here, we are dealing with an intangible right of a peculiar nature. It embraces the privilege of a member to transact business on the Exchange as well as a valuable
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Arguably, the business situs rule, recognized in the Court's five
property cases and Whitney, is limited to the area of due process

from which those cases arose, and has no application with respect to
the Commerce Clause. Under this view, the "business sims" of intangible property might satisfy due process "minimum contacts," but not
the substantial nexus required by the Commerce Clause. While this is
possible, the analyses of the cases in question suggest broad approval
of the pertinent taxes, and create no sense that an inquiry under the
dormant Commerce Clause would have changed the results.'3 Moreover, while Whitney was decided under the Due Process Clause, not
the Commerce Clause, subsequent Supreme Court cases in this area
have suggested that the analysis in Whitney applies under both claus.

es2

2. Use Tax: Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland
Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland.°5 involved an attempt by

Maryland to assert its use tax against a Delaware store which sold
merchandise to Maryland residents. While the store did advertise in

Maryland through newspaper, radio and some direct mailings, it had

right of property which is the subject of transfer with the approval of the Exchange .... ").
Relying on Whitney, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently determined that Maryland could
tax annuity payments received by a non-resident in connection with his winning the state
lottery. See Stark v. Comptroller, 554 A.2d 458 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), cert. denied, 559
A.2d 791 (Md. 1989). The court stated that:
The important aspect of Graves is the Court's conclusion that intangible property
for State tax purposes in a place other
can, in some circumstances, have a situs
than its owner's domicile and that a reviewing court is obliged to look at the
circumstances to determine whether the right or property at issue may also be of
"a peculiar nature" having a "localization" within the taxing State.
554 A.2d at 463 (quoting Whitney, 299 U.S. at 372).
203. The Commerce Clause analysis at the times in question-had it been applied-would
have been different from that which the Court uses today. See generally supra notes 71-80
and accompanying text.
204. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 444 (1980) (citing
Whitney for its Commerce Clause analysis); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756, 757 n.9, 758-59 (1967) (relying substantially on Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), a due process case which relied upon Whitney for both its
Commerce Clause and due process analyses); see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
Since Bellas Hess used Miller Brothers to create the physical presence rule, but did not
object to the assertion in that case that intangible property may create nexus, it seems that
Bellas Hess did not intend to implicitly overrule the business situs doctrine. See infra text
accompanying note 212. Moreover, the analysis in Bellas Hess appears especially significant,
since the joint due process-Commerce Clause analysis of that case was generally reaffirmed
by Quill.
205. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:407

no property or employees in Maryland, did not send agents into the
state for purposes of making sales, and did not accept mail or telephone orders.' Residents of Maryland made purchases at the store,
which they either took away, or had delivered by common carrier or
by means of the store's truck.2'e Taxing authorities in Maryland
found the truck within the state, seized it, and used it as the basis to
assert that state's use tax against the store on all sales made to Maryland residents.0 8

Miller Brothers was one of the Court's seminal use tax cases. 2' The Court invalidated the tax under the Due Process Clause
because there was no requisite "minimum connection" between the
state and the store.10 In its analysis, the Court considered all the

possible bases upon which it could establish the necessary "minimum
connection.,, 21 As part of its analysis, the Court stated:
Of course, the situs of property may tax it [sic] regardless of the
citizenship, domicile or residence of the owner, the most obvious
illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located. Also, the keeping of tangible or intangible personalty
within a state may give it a similar taxable situs 2there
(sometimes
2
called a business or commercial situs or domicile). '

Although Miller Brothers stated that its analysis was based upon
the Due Process Clause, and that it was therefore unnecessary to
consider the taxpayer's Commerce Clause claim," t3 Bellas Hess subsequently applied the Miller Brothers analysis to both constitutional
provisions.2t4 Bellas Hess' use of Miller Brothers indicates that the

206. See id. at 341-42, 345-46. The store's newspaper and radio advertising in Maryland
was indirect. See id. at 341-42; see also id. at 349-50. The store advertised using Delaware
newspapers and radio stations, and the advertising reached, with the store's notice, Maryland
residents. See id. at 341-42.
207. Id. at 341-42.
208. Id. at 341.
209. See id. at 343 ("We are dealing with a relatively new and experimental form of
taxation . . . . [It] raises questions of great importance to particular taxpayers, to the course
of commercial dealing among the states and as to appropriation by other states of tax resources properly belonging to the state where the event occurs.").
210. Id. at 344-47. For a discussion of the result in Miller Brothers in light of the
Court's subsequent holdings, see Rosen & Bernstein, supra note 60, at 554-55.
211. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-46.
212. Id. at 345 (footnotes omitted). Miller Brothers relied upon Whitney, among other
cases, for the proposition that intangible property-can create a taxable situs. Id. at 354-55
n.13. For a discussion of the commercial domicile doctrine, see supra note 196.
213. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347.
214. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. But see supra note 86 (questioning the
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Bellas Hess-Quill physical presence rule is founded in principles

which do not preclude a finding of nexus based upon intangible property. This is so because Miller Brothers suggests that intangible property used within a state can create taxing nexus.2"5
B. Reliance by the States
While Quill struggled to adhere to prior precedent,2 t6 it appeared primarily concerned with maintaining respect for the reliance
interests the Court created in the area of state taxation.2" 7 Thus,

Commerce Clause reasoning used in Bellas Hess).
215. See supra note 204. Quill similarly suggests this. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
Miller Brothers also indicates that the basis for the physical presence rule pertains
specifically to a use tax. In this regard, the facts in Miller Brothers make evident that the
physical presence rule is more equitable as to a use tax than it is as to an income tax,
since-at some core level, like in Miller Brothers-the imposition of a use tax, which is in
the nature of a "trustee" tax, appears unfair. See supra notes 12-13 (discussing the basis for
the imposition of a use tax). In contrast, as the Court's holdings in Whitney, discussed supra
notes 197-202 and accompanying text, and International Harvester, discussed supra note 177,
indicate, a physical presence rule is arguably not necessary to obtain fairness in the context
of an income tax-since this tax merely requires the person who derived the income from
the taxing state to pay back a small percentage. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 5, 1 6.0811] (stating that the Quill bright line rule may not be applicable in the context
of a direct tax obligation like the income tax, since the burden on the taxpayer to understand
his obligation in such contexts should logically be greater); Richard L. Lieberman & Stewart
Lipeles, The Geoffrey Case: A Failed Attempt to Provide Content to the Economic Nexus
Principle, 6 STATE TAX NoTEs 697, 713 (1994) (arguing that the physical presence standard
serves no purpose in the context of a direct tax); see also supra note 128 (suggesting that
the Quill physical presence rule may only apply to use tax); infra notes 240-57 and accompanying text (discussing the policy arguments with respect to out-of-state persons and income
tax). The trustee nature of a use tax suggests why Quill may have been decided as it was.
In light of the rule created by Bellas Hess, a contrary result in Quill would have been particularly inequitable-since Quill had not collected the back use tax which North Dakota
sought to collect and, presumably, had no practical recourse to the taxpayers who were primarily liable for this tax. See supra note 123.
216. See, e.g., supra note 86 and text accompanying notes 81-86.
217. See supra notes 114-27. Similarly, the Court stated in the recent case of AlliedSignal, which rejected a challenge to the imposition of an income tax:
Indeed, if anything would be unworkable in practice, it would be for us
now to abandon our settled jurisprudence defining the limits of state power to tax
under the unitary business principle. State legislatures have relied upon our precedents by enacting tax codes [with respect to this principle]. . . . [The state's]
proposal would disrupt settled expectations in an area of the law in which the
demands of the national economy require stability.
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2262 (1992); see also
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182-83 (1990) (plurality decision)
(refusing to apply retroactively a ruling striking down a tax on Commerce Clause grounds,
since, although the precise negative impact on the states could not be determined, the states
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there is a question as to whether the Supreme Court's prior pronouncements with respect to the business situs rule have engendered

any significant reliance by the states. In this regard, it is clear that at
least some of the states have evaluated the pertinent Supreme Court
precedent and taken the position-dating back prior to Geoffrey-that
the business situs of intangible property can create taxing' nexus." 8
Prior to Geoffrey, at least three states asserted nexus based upon
the business situs of intangible property, in reliance upon a state court
decision which approved this practice. 9 For example, New Mexico,
in reliance on three 1979 holdings by that state's court of appeals,

has asserted nexus as to franchisors with no physical presence in that
state, based upon license fees paid by an in-state franchisee."2 New
Mexico asserts nexus in these instances even if, unlike in Geoffrey,
the franchisor and franchisee are unaffiliated."' In addition, Hawaii,

in reliance on a 1976 holding by that state's supreme court, has asserted nexus as to businesses which license intangible rights for use
within that state.' Similarly, New Jersey, relying in part on a 1983
"cannot be expected to foresee that a decision of this Court would overturn established
precedents [and] the inequity of unsettling actions taken in reliance on those precedents is
apparent").
218. The following discussion does not purport to be an analysis of the precise level of
reliance evidenced by the fifty states. This subject is one which is beyond the scope of this
Article.
219. In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court suggested that the opinion of the state courts is
one factor in determining the justifiable reliance by the states. See National Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758-59 n.l1 (1967) (observing that the Alabama
Supreme Court reached a result similar to that reached in Bellas Hess). In light of Geoffrey,
the South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation takes the position that intangible
property which is present in South Carolina may give rise to nexus. See Information Letter
#94-5, South Carolina St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 1 340-028 (Feb. 22, 1994).
220. Telephone Interview with Dianne L. Rossbach, Tax Auditor, New Mexico Taxation
and Revenue Department (Oct. 13, 1994). The three cases, American Dairy Queen, AAMCO,
and Baskin Robbins, are discussed earlier. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. This
taxing activity, which dates back at least to the early 1980's deals with the state's gross
receipts tax. See GR Regulation 3(f):2, New Mexico St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
65-376 (1993).
The fact that this tax is not an income tax per se is not relevant to the constitutional analysis. See supra note 9. The state's regulation on the subject gives the following example:
Y, a pie company of Cambridge, Massachusetts, grants to X, of Virden, New
Mexico, the right to make pies according to their exclusive recipe and to operate
Y Pie shops throughout New Mexico. The right to make the pies and operate the
pie shops, whether granted for a "one-time" payment or for a continuing percentage of the proceeds of the shops, is a franchise. Therefore, the receipts of Y, from
its granting of the franchises are subject to gross receipts tax.
OR Regulation 3(1):2, New Mexico St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
65-376 (1993).
221. Id.; see also Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 16-18
(S.C.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993).
222. See Information Release No. 80-4, Hawaii St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
10-028.10 (1980).
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holding by that state's tax court, has asserted nexus based upon the
business presence in that state of intangible property.'
Other states have also reviewed the prevalent law and, based
upon that law, asserted nexus using a business situs theory. For example, Minnesota has asserted nexus pursuant to 1987 legislation
which provides that a person has nexus with that state---"without
regard to physical presence 2 4 -where the taxpayer engages in
"transactions with customers in [Minnesota] that involve intangible

property and result in income flowing to the person from within this
state
. ."' Moreover, North Carolina, has asserted nexus pursuant to a 1992 regulation that provides that a taxpayer is doing business in North Carolina where it owns in that state, for the purpose of

economic gain, "[t]rademarks, tradenames, franchise rights, computer
programs, copyrights, patented processes, [or] licenses." 6 Also,

The case was In re Heftel Broadcasting Honolulu, Inc., 554 P.2d 242 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1073 (1977). In Heftel, the issue was a privilege tax asserted against foreign corporations that had license agreements involving film telecast rights with Heftel, a local broadcasting company. Id. at 244. The assessments were on rental income received from Heftel
during a time when the corporations were not physically present or engaged in any activity
in Hawaii other than the ownership of and rental of film prints and their telecast rights, and
the shipment of films to Heftel. Id. The action was peculiar in the sense that, while CBS
was the party theoretically liable for the contested tax-and a "designated" appellant in the
action-Heftel was by contract the party responsible for the tax and the party who initiated
the action. See id. In addition, the CBS taxes were used as a "test case" for other, similar licensing arrangements, which involved a total of 41 other licensors. Id. Heftel sustained the
tax. It relied, for due process purposes, on the economic benefits test as stated by J.C. Penney. See id. at 247 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)); see also
supra note 25 and accompanying text). In addition, Heftel used a Commerce Clause analysis
similar to that used by the New Mexico court in Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. Revenue
Div., 599 P.2d 1098 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). See 554 P.2d at 248-49. The Commerce Clause
analysis used in Baskin-Robbins is discussed supra note 176.
223. Telephone Interview with Joseph Thiel, Assistant Director of Audit, New Jersey
Division of Taxation (Oct. 12, 1994). The case was Tuition Plan v. Director, Division of
Taxation, 4 N.J. Tax 470 (1982). In Tuition Plan, the court upheld a tax on a New Hampshire bank making loans to New Jersey residents, where the bank's presence in New Jersey
consisted only of sporadic visits by loan officers. The court stated:
[i]t is also well settled that the taxable situs of intangibles (such as plaintiff's loan
receivables) is the domicile of the owner-creditor unless the intangible has been
integrated with a business carried on in another state, in which case the taxable
situs is in the latter state. Thus, the situs of an intangible and the place where
income is earned are one and the same.
Id. at 482 (citations omitted). For a more detailed discussion of Tuition Plan and other
related New Jersey cases, see HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 146, 6.19[2][c].
224. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.015.1(b) (West 1989).
225. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.015.1(c)(3) (1989).
14226. See N.C. ADMIN. RULE § .0102(5)(C), 1 North Carolina St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
004 (Jan. 1, 1994). North Carolina asserted nexus on a limited basis in these instances even
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Texas, has asserted nexus pursuant to a 1992 regulation that provides
that a franchisor has nexus with that state if it enters into one or
more contracts with a person in Texas granting a franchisee the right

to engage in the sale of goods or services pursuant to a franchise
plan where "the operation of [the] franchisee's business pursuant to
such plan is substantially associated with the franchisor's trademark,
service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other commercial
symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate."' '
Minnesota has used the provision referenced in the preceding
paragraph, inter alia, to assert nexus against out-of-state credit card
and lending companies whose only presence in Minnesota are the
receivables due from Minnesota residents." Other states have simi-

larly asserted nexus against credit card and lending companies based
upon these facts, including Tennessee, Indiana and West Virginia. a9
In these lending situations, the states may take the position that nexus
exists under both a business situs and an economic presence or solicitation theoryY Moreover, in the instance of credit card companies,
before this provision was adopted. Telephone Interview with William Baker, Director, Corporate Income Tax and Franchise Tax, North Carolina Department of Revenue (Oct. 13,
1994).
227. See TFx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.546(c)(8)(B), 1 Texas St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
14-167 (1992). In addition, for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1994, Florida
will assert nexus pursuant to a 1993 regulation that provides that a corporation is subject to
tax where it sells or licenses the use of intangible property in Florida. See FLA. REG., Rule
12C-1.011(l)(p), I Florida St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
13-507 (1993). The Florida rule states,
inter alia: "For example, licensing the use of a trade name or trademark or patent to a business entity located in Florida will subject a corporation to corporate income tax." Id.
228. Telephone Interview with Bill Lunka, Corporate Tax Specialist, Minnesota Department of Revenue (May 12, 1994); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.015.2(a)(2) (West Supp.
1995). This type of nexus is similar to that asserted in the Supreme Court's early business
situs cases. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
229. Each state does so pursuant to special tax provisions which pertain specifically to
financial institutions. See IND. CODE ANN. § 6-5.5-3-1 (West Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-4-806(d) (Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 11-24-7b(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). New Jersey is in
the process of evaluating this approach. Telephone Interview with Joseph Thiel, Assistant
Director of Audit, New Jersey Division of Taxation (Oct. 12, 1994). Alabama began this
taxing practice, but was caused to stop by an opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court, which
determined that the statute relied upon by the state did not authorize this practice. See
Siegelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 575 So.2d 1041 (Ala. 1991). While Siegelnan did not
indicate whether Alabama's taxation of out-of-state credit card companies would have been
constitutional but for the statutory deficiency, two of the court's seven justices indicated, in a
concurrence, that it would have been. See id. at 1051 (Steagall & Maddux, JJ., concurring).
Iowa also began this taxing practice but stopped because of an opinion by the state's attorney general which concluded that this practice was not authorized by the Iowa statute. Telephone Interview with Jim Edwards, Tax Examiner, Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance
(May 12, 1994).
230. See supra note 229 (citing statutes). The economic presence approach is essentially
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the states may also take the position that the credit cards issued by
the companies constitute a physical presence in the taxing state, since
a credit card contract typically states that the credit card issued re-

mains the property of the credit card issuer."
C. Public Policy
1. In General
At least since Shaffer v. Carter,2 it has been widely accepted

that an individual's income may be taxed by the state in which it is
earned.

3

Consistent with this, it seems that constitutional nexus

a different way of stating the economic benefits analysis. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. A similar theory of nexus was used by the state of North Dakota in Quill. See
supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
231. See, e.g., Siegelman, 575 So.2d at 1042 ("The credit cards remain the property of
Chase [Manhattan], and may be recalled by Chase or returned by the cardholder for any
reason, or for no reason ....
"). Credit card companies--engaging in activity similar to that
in Geoffrey-evade tax by locating their personnel in low-tax states like Delaware or South
Dakota. See William F. Fox, Draft: Alternatives for Modernizing the Massachusetts Bank Tax
Structure, 5 STATE TAX NoTEs 96, 112 (1993); supra note 142 (discussing the tax motivation for the incorporation of Geoffrey).
232. 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
233. In this regard, Shaffer states:
And we deem it clear, upon principle as well as authority, that just as a
State may impose general income taxes upon its own citizens and residents whose
persons are subject to its control, it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty
of like character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes accruing to
non-residents from their property or business within the State, or their occupations
carried on therein; enforcing payment so far as it can, by the exercise of a just
control over persons and property within its borders. This is consonant with numerous decisions of this court sustaining state taxation of credits due to non-residents ....
Id. at 52 (citing Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S.
346, 354 (1911); Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 145 (1900); New Orleans v.
Stempel, 175 U.S. 309, 320-23 (1899)). While Shaffer pertained to a situation where the nonresident taxpayer owned real property within the taxing state, nothing in the above quotation
limits its scope to tangible, as opposed to intangible, property. Moreover, by referencing
Stempel, Bristol, and Liverpool, three of the Court's early business situs cases, the Court
suggests no such limitation was intended. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text
(discussing these cases and the origins of the business situs rule).
The later case of Curry v. McCanless contains language which is similar to that quoted from Shaffer
[T]here are many circumstances in which more than one state may have jurisdiction to impose a tax and measure it by some or all of the taxpayer's intangibles.
Shares of corporate stock may be taxed at the domicile of the shareholder and also
at that of the corporation which the taxing state has created and controls; and
income may be taxed both by the state where it is earned and by the state of the
recipient's domicile.
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was not an issue in the case of Whitney v. Graves-notwithstanding
the individual's lack of physical presence within the taxing
state-because the fact that the individual derived income from the
state suggested to the Court that there was something upon which the
state could constitutionally operateY While there should logically
be limitations on this principle, which could come from the Court's
Commerce Clause role as" guardian of the structure of the national

economy, it does not seem that any event-certainly not the Court's
decision in Bellas Hess or the reasons therefore-has caused the
principle to have any less force." Indeed, the Court has recently
continued to stress the notion that "'[i]t was not the purpose of the
commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce

from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though it increases
the cost of doing business."'

6

Thus, the Court's recent cases evi-

dence an intention-not to abandon previously established tax principles-but rather to determine the appropriate restrictions to be placed
thereon. 7 Given the above, it would seem inappropriate for the

Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368 (1939) (footnote omitted). Similar to the Shaffer
quotation, this language in Curry goes on to reference the Court's five early business situs
cases. See id.
234. For a discussion of Whitney, see supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text. International Harvester, discussed supra note 177, provides a similar example. Cf. Wisconsin v.
J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) ("'Taxable event,' 'jurisdiction to tax,' 'business
situs,' 'extraterritoriality,' are all compendious ways of implying the impotence of state power
because state power has nothing on which to operate.").
235. The mail order situation involved in Bellas Hess-and also, Quill-is conceptually
distinct, since in that situation the state seeks to impose a "trustee" obligation on an out-ofstate vendor to collect a tax which is ultimately owed by an in-state resident. See supra
notes 12-13, 215.
236. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 n.5 (1992) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981) (alteration in original)); see
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994) ("The [Commerce]
Clause does not shield interstate (or foreign) commerce from its 'fair.share of the state tax
burden."') (quoting Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978)). The notion that a corporation should pay its fair share of income
tax to the states in which it does business is a significant component of the Court's contemporary Commerce Clause approach. See supra note 9.
237. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258
(1992) (noting that a state's ability to levy a tax upon a corporation and the restrictions to
be applied to this legitimate taxing power are two distinct constitutional concerns). In the
recent case of Barclays Bank, the Court stated that, because it is difficult to determine the
purely local activity of a multi-state business, the Court will permit the income tax methodology used by the various states to be somewhat arbitrary:
The Due Process and Commerce Clauses . . . prevent States that impose an
income-based tax on nonresidents from "tax[ing] value earned outside [the taxing
State's] borders. But when a business enterprise operates in more than one taxing
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Court to establish a rigid physical presence rule in the area of income
tax, since this rule would unjustifiably cut back upon the policy evident in the Court's prior rulings, and would invite multi-state busi-

nesses to engage in tax manipulation." Moreover, this type of judicial "re-determination" seems especially inappropriate in light of
Quill, since that case suggests that policy questions arising under the
Commerce Clause are now to be resolved by Congress."39
2. Specific Areas of Concern
Commentators who have objected to the potential widespread
application of Geoffrey have expressed particular concern with respect
to two specific fact situations. First, these commentators have ex-

pressed concern with the possible assertion of nexus based upon
monies loaned to individuals who are located in the taxing state (i.e.,

the ownership of loan receivables sitused in such state). 2" However,
even prior to Geoffrey, several states asserted nexus as to credit card
and lending companies under these circumstances.24 Moreover,
while the commentators appear to be concerned with the assertion of
nexus as to de minimis lending activity,242 a de minimis presence

does not confer nexus.243
Second, commentators have also objected to the possible asser-

tion of nexus in the situation where a taxpayer not physically present

jurisdiction, arriving at "precise territorial allocations of 'value' is often an elusive
goal, both in theory and in practice." Every method of allocation devised involves
some degree of arbitrariness.
Barclays Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (upholding the
use of the unitary business principle). For a discussion of the unitary principle, see supra
note 146.
238. See Barclays Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 2272 (noting that the Court's recognition of taxation using the unitary business principle helps prevent the tax manipulation which occurs in
the use of separate accounting); see supra note 146.
239. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. Cf. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954) ("[the new implementation of the use tax] raises questions of great
importance to particular taxpayers, to the course of commercial dealing among the states and
as to appropriation by other states of tax resources properly belonging to the state in which
the event occurs").
240. See, e.g., CCH Board Comments, supra note 8, at 6 (comments of John J. Cronin
and Gary Dean); William J. Quirk, Geoffrey, Inc. Petitions High Court to Reverse State Supreme Court's Decision, 5 STATE TAx NoTas 959, 960 (1993); Stewart, supra note 8, at
421.
241. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., CCH Board Comments, supra note 8, at 6 (comments of John J. Cronin
and Gary Dean).
243. See supra note 110; see also supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
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in a state receives royalties from that state through the activities of a
third party intermediary (for example, royalties which are paid to a
book author, a television producer, or a person appearing in a commercial endorsement). 2' However, it is unclear whether there is currently any state enforcement activity in these types of situations.
Moreover, to be taxable, these situations would have to meet the
threshold test under the Due Process Clause, that the taxpayer in
question "purposefully direct" his or her activities towards the taxing
state.2 "
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will be quick to enter the
fray regarding the question of whether the ownership and use of
intangible property within a state confers constitutional taxing nexus
for income tax purposes.2 This is because, while there are certainly
important questions in this area to be resolved, the Court acknowledged in Quill that it is ill-suited for this type of problem resolution.24' However, in a situation like Geoffrey, where a corporation
derives income from intangible property located in a state in which
the corporation is not otherwise physically present, the analysis used
in Quill supports a determination that there may be taxing nexus.
This is because the Court has previously recognized a "business situs"
doctrine which posits taxing nexus as to intangible property where
that property is located and used within the taxing state.14 1 This
doctrine dates back almost one hundred years, and has been extended
by the Court to the area of income tax.249 Moreover, the states have
generally relied upon the business situs doctrine and, under Quill,

244. See, e.g., Geoffrey Cert. Brief, supra note 5, at 9, 20 (citing each example); Quirk,
supra note 240, at 960 (citing the example of an author and the commercial endorser); Stewart, supra note 8, at 421 (citing the example of the author)
245. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text and note 159; The Center for State and Local Taxation Symposium Focuses on
Taxation of Intangible Property, STATE TAX REV., Nov. 7, 1994, at 9 (arguing that Michael
Jordan should not be expected to pay tax to California merely because his face appears on
T-shirts in that state-absent a showing that Jordan has purposefully exploited the California
market) (comments of Thomas H. Steele). There is a similar inquiry under the Commerce
Clause, since it is the taxpayer's "activity" which must have substantial nexus with the taxing
state. See supra text accompanying note 82.
246. See supra note 127.
247. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 192-215.
249. See id.
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their reliance interest should be respected." °
While the business situs doctrine is consistent with the analysis
used in Quill, it appears to conflict with the Quill physical presence
requirement. However, this requirement was founded more than a

half-century after the Court's recognition of the business situs
rule-and in the area of use tax, not income tax."5 Moreover, the
business situs doctrine was cited with approval in one of the Court's
seminal use tax cases, Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, which the
Court later applied to create the Quill physical presence requirement."
Quill retained the physical presence rule in the area of use tax in
large part because it engendered substantial reliance by mail order
vendors and fostered the growth of the mail order business."sa Because the physical presence requirement has special application in the
area of use tax, it may not apply outside that area.'s 4 Alternatively,
if the physical presence requirement does apply to the area of income
tax, it seems that the business situs of intangible property can nonetheless meet this test." In this regard, the Court has previously indicated that the physical presence rule is not a rigid one. 6 Moreover, as the Court has suggested, the application of a rigid physical
presence test to intangible property makes no conceptual sense, since
intangible property is, by definition, not physical. 7
A rule which asserts constitutional nexus based upon the ownership and use of intangible property within a state would be consistent
with public policy, since this policy-as recently articulated by the

250. See supra notes 216-31 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 204, 206-15 and accompanying text.
252. See id.
253. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text and supra note 135; see also
Hellerstein, supra note 127, at 124 (stating that Quill may have established a physical presence standard only for the mail order industry).
254. See id. and supra note 215; see also supra note 204. Outside the area of use tax
the assertion of nexus may not require that a taxpayer be "present" through the ownership of
either tangible or intangible property. Thus, a taxpayer could be subject to income tax in a
state by virtue of its exploitation of the economic market in that state. See supra notes 18889 and note 230 and accompanying text.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 128-39.
256. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209 (1936) ("When we deal
with intangible property . . . we encounter the difficulty that by reason of the absence of
physical characteristics they have no situs in the physical sense, but have the situs attributable
to them in legal conception."); see also supra note 166 (quoting Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357, 365-66 (1939)).
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Supreme Court-posits that multi-state businesses pay their fair share
of state tax, even though this payment increases the cost of doing
business." In contrast, without such a rule, an intangibles corporation, like the taxpayer in Geoffrey, can be created such that it pays
no tax to many of the states in which it transacts business." Moreover, while commentators have criticized the potential application of
Geoffrey, their concerns may be generally addressed under constitutional principles which are already outstanding.2
Quill clarifies that Congress can determine the rules regarding
taxing nexus, and suggests that the Court would prefer that this legis" ' However, since Congress has
lative body address these questions.26
been reluctant to act in this area, the Court may ultimately be responsible for determining the nexus rules with respect to intangible property and income tax."

258. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 146 and notes
233-34 and accompanying text.
259. Geoffrey involved the situation where an affiliated group incorporated an intangibles
corporation under Delaware law to minimize the combined group's state tax. Geoffrey, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 427 S.E.2d 13, 15 (S.C.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993).
Thus, there were two separate theories of intangible presence which were potentially applicable in that case: the intangible property theory, which has been the focus of this Article, and
the fact that the unitary business of the affiliated group, taken as a whole, was present in
South Carolina. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 n.10
(1994) (noting that the theory which underlies unitary taxation is that "'certain intangible
"flows of value" within the unitary group serve to link the various members together as if
they were essentially a single entity."'); supra notes 146, 150. Some commentators have
minimized the significance of the Geoffrey ruling by focusing on the fact that Geoffrey involved a controlled group. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 5, at 37. However, the tax manipulation sought to be corrected by Geoffrey also occurs in situations involving intangible property where there is no affiliated group. See generally supra notes 228-31 and accompanying
text.
260. See generally supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
262. Congress did investigate the taxation of intangible property in 1965. See HOUSE
CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAxATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 565,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1038 (1965). The report is often referred to as the "Willis Report" for
Congressman Edwin E. Willis, who chaired the pertinent subcommittee. However, since the
enactment of Public Law 86-272, Congress has enacted only minor legislation with any effect
upon state corporate taxation. See Roin, supra note 179, at 1242 n.69; supra note 113 (discussing the application of Public Law 86-272 to the sale of personal property).
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